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The world of work has changed dramatically for immigrants 
since the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) 
in 19521 and its 1965 amendment.2 Since the late 1940s, Congress 
contemplated worksite immigration enforcement as a way to deal 
with undocumented immigration.3 In 1986, Congress enacted the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”),4 which amended 
the INA and, for the first time, implemented a worksite enforcement 
 
 1. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 2. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).  
 3. The calls were in response to a growing number of temporary workers admitted 
through the Bracero Program, which produced more than four million temporary workers 
between 1942 and 1964. See PHILIP MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, 
IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM WORKERS 48 (2003). 
 4. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).  
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system and employer sanctions for knowingly hiring undocumented 
workers.5 Since then, the federal government’s focus on worksite 
immigration enforcement has been on employers. Nonetheless, there 
has been a gradual and subtle shift over the decades from a discussion 
about the use of an employer sanction system designed to dissuade 
employers from recruiting foreign labor to present-day calls for 
criminalizing unauthorized work at the state level. Importantly, this 
shift in focus is not reflected in the federal law, which sanctions 
employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers but not 
employees for performing undocumented work. Employers have 
succeeded in weakening the provisions created to dissuade them from 
hiring undocumented workers, thus shifting the scrutiny, at least at 
the state level, to the workers themselves. Calls for regulating 
immigration by criminalizing the worker have increased.6 The result is 
an expanding deportation (and now detention) apparatus increasingly 
focusing on undocumented workers.7 State efforts to criminalize the 
use of false identifying information to obtain work exemplify this 
gradual shift to a focus on workers.  
How did we get here? This Article focuses on the criminalization 
of false use of Social Security numbers or other employment 
authorization documents for work and proceeds in three parts. Part I 
follows the transformation of temporary work in the United States 
from a legal guestworker-type program to the development of the 
federal employer sanctions system to deal with the failures of past 
guestworker programs. This Part demonstrates the consequences of 
the employer sanctions system and the Supreme Court’s approach to 
federal and state roles in worksite immigration enforcement. It then 
introduces Congress’s enactment of identity theft laws and their effect 
on worksite enforcement. Part II demonstrates how the workers 
themselves have increasingly become the targets of enforcement. It 
reveals the move over the past decade by states to enact identity theft 
statutes that include the false use of identifying information for work. 
Part III explores whether states’ attempts to criminalize the use of 
false Social Security numbers for work are preempted, given 
Congress’s dual purpose to regulate immigration in the workplace 
and to protect individuals from identity theft. The Article concludes 
with a call for a return to Congress’s intent of disincentivizing the 
 
 5. Id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012). 
 6. See Janice Kephart, Fixing Flores: Assuring Adequate Penalties for Identity Theft 
and Fraud, CENTER FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Jan. 2010), http://cis.org/Flores-Figueroa. 
 7. See infra Part I.D. 
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employer preference for undocumented workers rather than placing 
the blame on the workers who are drawn into the migration stream. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKPLACE IMMIGRATION 
REGULATION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A. The Making of the Temporary Worker Through Immigration 
Regulation in Twentieth Century Immigration Law 
Several scholars have written about the sometimes-conflicting 
goals of temporary worker and contract labor programs to (1) provide 
a steady labor supply to some of the most needy industries (mostly 
agricultural), (2) protect jobs for available U.S. workers, and (3) 
regulate immigration into the United States.8 Through these 
programs, the interests of labor and the interests of employers who 
need the temporary labor are mediated by federal agencies, namely 
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”), or its predecessor, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”).9 In ongoing negotiations over the 
need and the number of immigrants required to fill positions, the 
related goals of adequate employment law enforcement and 
preservation of living wage standards for the available jobs have 
become secondary to the twin goals of preserving jobs for Americans 
and immigration enforcement. 
Calls for worksite immigration regulation to dissuade employers 
from hiring undocumented workers occurred against this backdrop. 
In response to these competing goals, legislators not only restricted 
immigration but also tried to regulate private actors by, for example, 
making it a crime to harbor illegal aliens.10 While the concept of 
employer sanctions was floated in legislative proposals leading up to 
the first comprehensive immigration law in 1952, none were 
successful.11 Nonetheless, the debates leading up to the Immigration 
 
 8. See, e.g., George C. Kiser, Mexican American Labor Before World War II, 2 J. 
MEX. AM. HIST. 122, 131–32 (1972). 
 9. See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 
IMMIGRATION AND THE I.N.S. 181 (2d ed. 2010). 
 10. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 
163, 228–29 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)). The provision makes it an 
immigration violation to bring an alien into the United States other than through a 
designated port of entry, or to otherwise induce, transport, conceal, harbor, or shield an 
undocumented person in the United States. Id. 
 11. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R55-752, 96TH CONG. REP. ON TEMPORARY WORKER 
PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 39–40 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter CRS 
WORKER] (“Attempts to pass legislation prohibiting the employment of and establishing 
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and Nationality Act of 1952 and its 1965 amendment mirrored the 
later discussions over the efficacy of worksite immigration 
enforcement that led to employer sanctions in 1986.12 
B. The 1952 and 1965 Immigration and Nationality Acts 
Congress formally debated guestworker programs as part of 
immigration law in the early 1950s. Before then, guest workers were 
considered the product of contract labor agreements and not 
necessarily part of the immigration regulatory scheme. Part of the 
debate at the time was whether authority over a guestworker program 
should rest with the DOL or INS.13 This debate reflected the tug-of-
war between the DOL and INS over the use of the immigration 
system enforcement mechanisms to regularize Mexican workers for 
employers.14 This recurring debate assumed Mexicans would enter the 
United States to work and return to Mexico after the work was 
completed.15 Mexican labor, in other words, was cast in the debates as 
transient or temporary, as evidenced by their status under the then-
existing Bracero Program.16 When Congress enacted the H-2 
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 allowing for 
guest workers,17 there was much lobbying for folding the Bracero 
Program,18 authorized under a separate contract labor agreement and 
 
penalties for the harboring of illegal aliens in 1951 and 1952 were only partially 
successful . . . . [During debates,] Senator Paul Douglas offered an amendment to provide 
penalties for the employment of illegal aliens . . . . It was resoundingly defeated.”). 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 123–27 (discussing the INS “wrangling” with the DOL 
over control of the guestworker program). 
 14. MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICA 152–53 (William Chafe et al. eds., 2004). 
 15. This characterization of Mexican labor as transient or temporary was cast early in 
the history of federal immigration regulation, in part because immigration regulation 
divided into a two-tiered bureaucracy. The Bureau of Immigration within the Department 
of Labor regulated temporary workers from Mexico and other parts of the Western 
Hemisphere. See DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 168 (2002); Leticia M. Saucedo, Mexicans, 
Immigrants, Cultural Narratives and National Origin, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 321–33 (2012).  
 16. TICHENOR, supra note 15, at 152, 173.  
 17. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 
168 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2012)). 
 18. For a more in-depth discussion of the Bracero Program, see generally DEBORAH 
COHEN, BRACEROS: MIGRANT CITIZENS AND TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECTS IN THE 
POSTWAR UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (2011) (describing the development of the 
Bracero Program as a bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico and the 
responses of American and Mexican workers to the Program). 
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legislation, into the proposed guest worker provisions. Congress 
ultimately declined.19 
During this period, the calls for curbing undocumented 
immigration were growing. President Truman advocated for 
employer sanctions—harsh and stiff penalties for employers who 
knowingly hired undocumented workers—as well as increased 
immigration authority to inspect workplaces without warrants.20 
Employer sanctions were hotly debated and ultimately defeated by a 
large margin.21 After much debate, the 1952 Act included a 
compromise: the criminalization of the willful importation, 
transportation, or harboring of illegal aliens.22 This crime was 
considered a felony punishable by a $2,000 fine or imprisonment of 
up to five years, or both.23 The provision was initially introduced as a 
penalty for employers who actively engaged in recruiting and bringing 
workers into the country.24 After much lobbying, however, 
employment of undocumented workers was specifically exempted 
from the harboring definition.25 
After Congress enacted the 1952 Act, proposals to curtail 
undocumented immigration from Mexico continued to emerge.26 
Around the same time, the immigration agency began a massive 
deportation campaign known as Operation Wetback.27 Proposals for 
employer sanctions again surfaced, with the purpose of encouraging 
employers to use the Bracero Program—rather than undocumented 
workers—for their labor needs.28 These proposals were defeated, in 
part because employers strongly objected to government intrusion 
into the worksite.29 At the time, employers and government agencies 
still considered contract labor programs outside the realm of 
traditional immigration regulation.30 
 
 19. CRS WORKER, supra note 11, at 53. 
 20. Id. at 38. 
 21. Id. at 39–40. 
 22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 274, 66 Stat. 163, 
228–29 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324). 
 23. Id. 
 24. CRS WORKER, supra note 11, at 39–40. 
 25. Id. at 40.  
 26. JUAN RAMÓN GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 161 (1980). 
 27. Id. at 169, 183. 
 28. Id. at 160–61. 
 29. Id. at 161–63. 
 30. See TICHENOR, supra note 15, at 150–51 (describing the two-tiered immigration 
regulation system consisting of permanent immigration on the one hand and temporary 
labor programs on the other).  
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The 1965 Act abolished the long-held tradition of national 
origins quotas embedded in immigration law.31 The law is seen as a 
triumph of liberalism over the conservative restrictionist views that 
excluded generations of Asians and others from a rightful place in the 
migration stream.32 The law also limited the number of immigrant 
visas available for unskilled manual work, a decision that mostly 
affected Mexican workers.33 Furthermore, the 1965 Act was not 
generous to temporary workers, in part because of the heavy pressure 
from organized labor and others to end foreign-contract labor 
programs. During the hearings on the 1965 Act, the AFL-CIO urged 
that any amendments to the Act allow only for permanent and not 
temporary immigration for work.34 The House Report on the 1965 
amendments also clarified that there was no path to permanent status 
in the proposed preference categories that were to replace national 
origins quotas.35 The Senate Report on the 1965 amendments was also 
silent on the subject of temporary agricultural labor, noting that 
“[t]he bill specifically provides that skilled or unskilled labor of a 
temporary or seasonal nature is not to be entitled to any preference 
under the selection system for the allocation of immigrant visas.”36 
To ensure that the temporary Mexican labor program was not 
simply replaced with a path to permanent residence, the 1965 
Congress imposed caps on the immigrant visas available to the 
western hemisphere countries.37 The move was made in the name of 
 
 31. Congress enacted emergency national origins quotas in 1921, which were set to 
expire on June 30, 1922. Emergency Quota Act, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 5, 42 Stat. 5, 7 (1921). 
Congress then made quotas permanent in the 1924 Immigration Act, which set the annual 
quota of any nationality at two percent of the number of immigrants from that country 
resident in the U.S. in 1890. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 
153, 159 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The INA of 1965 finally 
abolished the national origins quotas. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-236, § 201(e), 79 Stat. 911, 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.) (“The immigration pool and the quotas of quota areas shall terminate June 30, 
1968.”). 
 32. Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New 
Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1996). 
 33. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79 Stat. 911, 
912–14 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012)); see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM 
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42560, MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED 
STATES: POLICY AND TRENDS 7–8 (2012) (discussing how an increased push for Mexican 
migration coincided with the reduced availability of visas for those workers). 
 34. CRS WORKER, supra note 11, at 68. 
 35. Id. at 68–69. 
 36. Id. at 69. 
 37. Douglas A. Massey & Karen A. Pren, Unintended Consequences of US 
Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post-1965 Surge from Latin America, 38 POPULATION 
& DEV. REV. 1, 1 (2012). 
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fairness. Congress denounced the inequity of imposing caps on the 
rest of the world while leaving the Western Hemisphere relatively 
free of such regulation.38 The 1965 Congress ignored, however, the 
level of regulation occurring both through temporary work programs 
and through inadmissibility provisions aimed at controlling Mexican 
immigration. Once the temporary programs were eliminated and caps 
placed on immigration, the rise of undocumented immigration was 
inevitable. Sociologist Douglas Massey notes that while the numbers 
of legal immigrants remained fairly constant between 1965 and 1985, 
the number of temporary workers decreased and the numbers of 
illegal entrants increased at roughly the same levels.39 According to 
Massey’s calculations, the temporary worker population went from 
about 450,000 in 1955 to almost zero by 1968, while the 
undocumented population went from about 50,000 to about 400,000 
by 1975.40 
C. The Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 
By 1986, the consequences of failing to create a viable legal path 
for immigration workers coming to the United States from Mexico 
were evident, although their implications were highly contested. On 
the one hand, immigration advocates joined with employers and 
others to push for a path to permanent residence and citizenship.41 On 
the other hand, restrictionists called for increased border enforcement 
and employer sanctions to curb illegal immigration flows.42 The result 
was again a compromise. 
In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,43 Congress 
finally implemented the employer sanctions provisions that had been 
debated since the 1950s.44 The main provision states that “[i]t is 
unlawful for a person or other entity . . . to hire, or to recruit or refer 
for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing the 
alien is an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such employment.”45 
 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Id. at 4. 
 40. Id. 
 41. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182–83. 
 42. TIMOTHY J. HENDERSON, BEYOND BORDERS: A HISTORY OF MEXICAN 
MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 113 (Jürgen Buchenau ed., 2011). 
 43. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
 44. Id. § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012); CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182 (“[T]he 
political engine in IRCA was the employer sanctions provision, making it illegal to 
knowingly employ unauthorized workers.”). 
 45. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A). 
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The statute also calls for sanctions for a “pattern and practice” of 
activity that shows regular, repeated, and intentional activities related 
to knowingly hiring undocumented workers.46 Therefore, the statute 
explicitly and clearly placed the onus on employers to ensure that 
unauthorized hiring ceased. At the time, Congress intended this 
section of the statute to apply to employers, who were responsible for 
verifying employment.47 The statute imposed clear sanctions for 
breach of this new responsibility.48 
The statute’s fraud provision was likewise aimed at employers.49 
The provision makes it a felony offense to use a false identification 
document, or misuse a real one, for the purpose of satisfying the 
employer’s verification requirements.50 This provision requires all 
employers to verify and document that all of their employees have the 
legal right to work in the United States.51 The fraud subsection 
penalizes fraud in the employer’s use of documents to satisfy the 
verification requirements.52 Recall that Congress’s purpose was to 
dissuade employers from pulling illegal immigrants into the country 
for employment.53 Thus, the provision achieves Congress’s intent to 
place responsibility on employers to document their employees’ work 
authorization to the federal government.54 
At the time of deliberation, the employer sanctions provision was 
promoted as one of several effective tools for shutting down illegal 
immigration.55 By including worksites in the immigration enforcement 
scheme, immigration regulation would surely become more efficient 
and effective.56 Employers were not so enthusiastic about their 
proposed responsibilities for immigration regulation, in large part 
because the statute proposed to make them responsible for the 
 
 46. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f). 
 47. For discussion of congressional purpose and intent, see Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012). 
 48. IRCA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
 49. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). 
 50. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). 
 51. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). 
 52. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). The provision imposes a fine or imprisonment 
to anyone who uses “(1) an identification document, knowing (or having reason to know) 
that the document was not issued lawfully for the use of the possessor, (2) an identification 
document knowing (or having reason to know) that the document is false, or (3) a false 
attestation” to verify employment authorization. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b)(1)–(3). 
 53. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text. 
 54. IRCA § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b). 
 55. See S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 7–8 (1983) (describing the congressional plan to 
discourage immigration through broader enforcement coupled with an employer sanctions 
system). 
 56. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182. 
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migration flow.57 After some advocacy during the deliberation over 
the efficacy of employer sanctions, Congress weakened the provision 
with a safe harbor amendment for employers that requested 
documentation from workers regardless of its validity.58 
In 1990, Congress added some enforcement teeth by giving the 
INS the authority to assess monetary penalties against an employer 
for failure to comply with the employer sanctions provisions, whether 
such failure was willful or reckless.59 In 1996, however, the employer 
sanctions provisions were further weakened. With the Sonny Bono 
Amendment—named after its sponsor—Congress allowed employers 
to correct “technical or procedural” I-9 employee verification 
document violations if they resulted from a “good faith” effort to 
comply with employment verification requirements and so long as the 
mistakes were corrected within ten days of notice by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).60 
The employer sanctions regulations now provide a safe harbor 
for employers who did not “knowingly hire” undocumented 
workers.61 This was done at the behest of employers who argued that 
they should not be held strictly liable for criminal fines and 
sanctions.62 The regulation states: 
An employer or a recruiter or referrer for a fee for employment 
who shows good faith compliance with the employment 
verification requirements of § 274a.2(b) of this part shall have 
established a rebuttable affirmative defense that the person or 
entity has not violated section 274A(a)(1)(A) of the Act with 
respect to such hiring, recruiting, or referral.63 
In response to concerns that an employer sanctions system would 
incentivize the creation of systems to produce and distribute false 
documents, IRCA also included fraud provisions sanctioning 
individuals who use false or fraudulent documents to obtain 
employment.64 The penalties for workers include civil fines,65 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 183; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3360, 3360–61 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3)). 
 59. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 544, 104 Stat. 4978, 5057–59 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324c). 
 60. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 411, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-666 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6)). 
 61. CALAVITA, supra note 9, at 182. 
 62. Id. at 182–83. 
 63. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.4 (2014). 
 64. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 103, 100 Stat. 
3360, 3360–61 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)). 
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immigration penalties,66 and criminal sanctions.67 Importantly, 
Congress limited both the immigration penalties and the enforcement 
of fraud to enforcement by federal agencies.68 
Given the congressional purpose to focus on employer sanctions, 
ICE has used its discretion in worksite enforcement to rely heavily on 
immigration penalties and civil sanctions rather than criminal 
sanctions.69 ICE priorities have also changed with administrations. 
For example, in 1999, enforcement focused on employers who 
practiced a pattern of knowingly hiring undocumented workers and 
on employers who abused workers and violated various employment 
laws.70 After the terrorist attacks in 2001, worksite enforcement 
activities shifted to removal of undocumented workers from military 
bases and airports.71 According to a Congressional Research Service 
(“CRS”) report, between 2003 and 2012 ICE brought 20,631 
administrative (civil) charges, compared to 5,131 criminal charges in 
worksite enforcement operations.72 Since 2008, the numbers of both 
civil and criminal charges have diminished significantly, reflecting 
ICE’s renewed focus on employers.73 In 2012, almost half of the 
criminal arrests in worksites were of managerial employees, indicating 
the arrests were for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers.74 As a 
recent CRS report noted, “ICE administrative and criminal arrests in 
 
 65. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(d)(3) (2012). 
 66. Id. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(i) (making “[a]n alien who is the subject of a final order for 
violation of section 1324c of this title [] deportable”); id. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (making those 
who make false claims to citizenship, including for purposes of employment verification, 
inadmissible). 
 67. Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(F) (limiting criminal sanctions to specified federal statutes and 
requiring that information provided for employment verification “not be used for law 
enforcement purposes, other than for enforcement of this chapter or sections 1001 
[relating to false statements], 1028 [relating to fraud in connection with identity 
documents], 1546 [relating to fraud in immigration documents], and 1621 [relating to 
perjury] of title 18”). 
 68. See id. § 1324a(b)(5) (limiting use of the Form I-9 attestation form “and any 
information contained in or appended to such form” to “enforcement of this chapter and 
sections 1001, 1028, 1546, and 1621 of title 18”); id. § 1324a(d)(2)(F). 
 69. See TICHENOR, supra note 15, at 262–63 (describing the lax employer sanctions 
policies that developed from the inception of the legislation); see also Kitty Calavita, 
Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1041, 1049–55 (1990) (describing how low level fines and sanctions 
correlate with widespread disregard of the employer sanctions provisions by employers).  
 70. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40002, IMMIGRATION-RELATED 
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 2 (2013) [hereinafter CRS 
REPORT]. 
 71. Id. at 5. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 7. 
 74. Id. at 8. 
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worksite enforcement operations represent a very small percentage of 
the potential population of [immigration] violators.”75 At the high 
mark of administrative arrests in 2008, for example, ICE arrested 
5,184 people at worksites.76 That year there were an estimated 8.3 
million undocumented immigrants in the United States.77 
Today, the executive branch, in implementing IRCA, has shifted 
the focus back to employer responsibility through strong labor and 
employment enforcement that parallels the immigration enforcement 
scheme.78 This approach aims to become an integrated part of the 
federal plan to deter undocumented employment. As one 
commentator noted: 
Enforcement activity by the [DOL] is also relevant to a 
discussion of federal efforts to curtail unauthorized 
employment. DOL, which is responsible for enforcing minimum 
wage, overtime pay, and related requirements, focuses a 
significant percentage of its enforcement resources on low-wage 
industries that employ large numbers of immigrant—and 
presumably large numbers of unauthorized—workers.79 
Enforcement of employment laws sends a signal to employers that the 
federal government will use multiple enforcement mechanisms to 
hold employers accountable. Recently, the Obama administration 
initiated the development of an interagency taskforce, including the 
Department of Labor, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Justice, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
and National Labor Relations Board to ensure that undocumented 
workers did not bear the brunt of enforcement efforts against 
unauthorized immigration.80 Among its priorities, the Work Group 
will seek to ensure that “federal enforcement authorities are not used 
by parties seeking to undermine worker protection laws by enmeshing 
immigration authorities in labor disputes.”81 This shift in enforcement 
priorities acknowledges that employers have developed strategies to 
exploit workers and deter them from asserting their rights, despite the 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2009). 
 78. See Fact Sheet: Establishment of Interagency Work Group for the Consistent 
Enforcement of Federal Labor, Employment and Immigration Laws , U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/fact-sheet/immigration/interagency-working-group.htm (last visited 
Apr. 28, 2015) [hereinafter DOL Fact Sheet].  
 79. CRS REPORT, supra note 70, at i. 
 80. DOL Fact Sheet, supra note 78. 
 81. Id.  
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emphasis in immigration law on an employer sanctions worksite 
enforcement regime.82 
D. The Evolution of Agency Immigration Regulation from Border 
Apprehensions to Interior Enforcement and Deportations 
Over the past twenty years, immigration enforcement has shifted 
from the border to the interior. The immigration system consists of 
two agencies, ICE83 and Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”).84 ICE 
conducts interior enforcement efforts while CBP conducts 
enforcement at border points within 100 miles of the border.85 
Apprehensions moved from the border to the interior starting in the 
1990s, and, by 2011, interior apprehensions amounted to almost half 
of the total.86 Coincidentally, this shift correlates with increased state 
interest in immigration regulation. 
The Obama administration has overseen the largest number of 
deportations in the history of immigration enforcement.87 The 
administration has deported more immigrants in its first five years 
than the Bush administration did in its eight-year tenure.88 More than 
4.5 million noncitizens have been deported from the United States 
since 1996, when Congress passed very restrictive immigration 
legislation.89 Since then, formal removals have increased from 
approximately 70,000 in 1996 to 420,000 in 2012.90 This growth in 
 
 82. Id.  
 83. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/ero (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
 84. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov (last visited Apr. 28, 
2015); CBP Through the Years, CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/ 
about/history (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
 85. See Enforcement and Removal Operations, supra note 83; 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) 
(2014). 
 86. See Massey & Pren, supra note 37, at 15, 27. 
 87. Alejandra Marchevsky & Beth Baker, Why Has President Obama Deported More 
Immigrants Than Any President in US History?, NATION (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/179099/why-has-president-obama-deported-more-
immigrants-any-president-us-history. 
 88. MARC ROSENBLUM & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE 
DEPORTATION DILEMMA: RECONCILING TOUGH AND HUMANE ENFORCEMENT 1 
(2014), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/deportation-dilemma-
reconciling-tough-humane-enforcement.  
 89. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also, ROSENBLUM & MEISSNER, supra note 88, at 1 
(“More than 4.5 million noncitizens have been deported from the United States since 
Congress passed sweeping legislation in 1996 to toughen the nation’s immigration 
enforcement system.”).  
 90. ROSENBLUM & MEISSNER, supra note 88, at 1.  
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deportations is mostly from interior enforcement activities.91 The 
increased enforcement mechanism could not be carried out through 
ICE enforcement alone since there are only slightly over 20,000 ICE 
enforcement personnel throughout the country.92 To address this 
shortfall, Congress and the executive branch established collaborative 
programs with state and local governments to identify and hold 
undocumented immigrants who end up in local jails.93 Programs like 
Secure Communities94 led to a massive increase in the numbers of 
undocumented immigrants arrested and held for ICE authorities.95 
The Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”), a program within ICE 
responsible for identifying removable noncitizens in state and local 
jails and prisons, produced the vast majority of deportations in the 
last decade.96 The program relies on local and state penal institutions 
to share lists of detainees who may be removable.97 
Sociologists Massey and Pren explain that while the shift to 
interior enforcement and deportations was rooted in a desire for 
security and the fear of terrorism, it resulted in the massive 
deportations of Latinos: 
In the 1990s the Cold War was replaced by the threat of 
terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 and the 2001 Patriot Act intensified border 
enforcement and, more importantly, brought about a sharp rise 
in deportations from the United States. Deportations replaced 
border apprehensions as the visible manifestation of the Latino 
threat. Although the resulting feedback look was not as 
powerful as the apprehension-based loop that prevailed from 
 
 91. Massey & Pren, supra note 37, at 15. 
 92. See History of ICE, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/history (last visited Apr. 28, 2015). 
 93. Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Apr. 28, 2015).  
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. The Obama administration recently discontinued the Secure Communities 
program and replaced it with the Priority Enforcement Program. See Memorandum, Jeh 
Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities 1–3 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf. 
 96. See The Criminal Alien Program (CAP): Immigration Enforcement in Prisons and 
Jails, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/criminal-alien-
program-cap-immigration-enforcement-prisons-and-jails (last visited Apr. 28, 2015) 
(describing the CAP program as responsible for the largest number of noncitizen 
apprehensions).  
 97. Id. (“Penal institutions that participate in CAP share information about their 
inmates with ICE and allow ICE agents to interview suspected removable immigrants.”). 
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1965 to 1995, it was potent nonetheless and deportations 
expanded even as apprehensions fell in the decade after 2000.98 
The growing criticism of the federal government’s interior 
enforcement efforts led the Obama administration to rescind its 
enforcement policies.99 On November 20, 2014, DHS discontinued its 
Secure Communities program, replacing it with a Priority 
Enforcement Program.100 Under the new program, the federal 
government will advise local and state law enforcement authorities 
that it will seek the transfer to federal immigration authorities of only 
those who are national security risks or who have been convicted of 
high-priority crimes.101 These crimes include gang-related offenses; 
offenses classified as felonies in the convicting jurisdiction, other than 
a state or local offense for which an essential element was the alien’s 
immigration status; and aggravated felonies, as that term is defined in 
the immigration statute.102 Under this new program, the question 
remains whether immigration status will be considered an essential 
element of state identity theft convictions for use of false information 
for work. 
 
 98. Massey & Pren, supra note 37, at 23. 
 99. The criticism over programs such as Secure Communities arose not just from 
advocates but also from the judicial branch. Courts throughout the United States 
questioned the constitutionality of the federal government’s detainer request policies, 
which required local and state law enforcement agencies to detain undocumented 
noncitizens after arrest. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 2 n.1 (citing Miranda-Olivares v. 
Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1 (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2014) 
(holding that county violated the Fourth Amendment by honoring an ICE detainer that 
did not provide probable cause regarding removability); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. 
Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.l. 2014) (holding that detention under an immigration detainer “for 
purposes of mere investigation is not permitted”); Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 5452, 
2014 WL 4814776, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (allowing plaintiffs’ claim that ICE’s 
detainer procedures violate probable cause requirements); Villars v. Kubiatoski, No. 12 
CV 4586, 2014 WL 1795631, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2014) (allowing Fourth Amendment 
claims that ICE detainer was issued without probable cause of an immigration violation); 
Uroza v. Salt Lake City, No. 2:11CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *6–7 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 
2013) (denying dismissal on qualified immunity grounds where plaintiff claimed that 
immigration detainer without probable cause); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012 
WL 1080020, at *15 (E.D. Pa. March 30, 2012) (denying qualified immunity to 
immigration officials who issued immigration detainer without probable cause), rev’d on 
other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (2014) (reversing district court’s finding of no municipal 
liability)). 
 100. Johnson, supra note 95, at 1–3. 
 101. See id. at 2. 
 102. Memorandum, Jeh Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial 
_discretion.pdf. 
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The Supreme Court has addressed the treatment of 
undocumented workers in several cases that ultimately limit the 
ability of federal and state governments to read employer sanctions 
provisions expansively. The next section discusses the most important 
of these cases.  
E. The Supreme Court Cases on Worksite Immigration Enforcement 
Employers continue to be the focus of the employer sanctions 
provisions. The Supreme Court continues to limit the authority of 
federal agencies and the states to sanction employees. The Court has 
used statutory interpretation principles as well as constitutional 
structural arguments grounded in federalism to enforce this limited 
state authority at the same time that it has confirmed the federal 
nature of immigration regulation.  
1.  Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB (2002) 
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB,103 the Supreme Court 
decided the contours of workplace rights available to undocumented 
workers.104 Although IRCA’s employer sanctions prohibited the 
knowing employment of unauthorized workers, the statute did 
nothing to diminish the workplace protections of undocumented 
workers; in fact, post-IRCA decisions in several fields of employment 
and labor law reaffirmed the principle that employment and labor law 
remedies were available to all workers regardless of immigration 
status.105 The issues in Hoffman tested this principle. 
Hoffman arose out of an unfair labor practice claim alleging the 
employer had retaliated against several workers for participating in a 
labor organizing drive.106 The NLRB ruled in favor of the workers, 
including Jose Castro.107 At a subsequent hearing to determine 
 
 103. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 104. Id. at 150–52. 
 105. See, e.g., NLRB v. APRA Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 
1997) (holding that IRCA “did not diminish the Board’s power to craft remedies for 
violations of the NLRA”), abrograted by Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 
U.S. 137 (2002); Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the 
argument that Congress did not intend to cover undocumented workers as “contrary to 
the overwhelming weight of authority”); EEOC v. Switching Sys. Div. of Rockwell Int’l 
Corp., 783 F. Supp. 369, 374 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“Plaintiff plainly is correct that Title VII’s 
protections extend to aliens who may be in this country either legally or illegally.”). But 
see Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
plaintiff had no cause of action seeking reinstatement because of his expired work 
authorization). 
 106. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140. 
 107. Id. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1505 (2015) 
2013] THE "WRONGFULLY" DOCUMENTED 1521 
damages, Castro testified that he was not authorized to work in the 
United States and that he had used the birth certificate of a U.S. 
citizen friend to obtain employment.108 The administrative law judge 
found that Castro was not entitled to back pay or reinstatement as a 
result of his testimony.109 The NLRB reversed as to backpay and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari.110 
The Supreme Court vacated the backpay award, reasoning that 
the policy rationales behind IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions 
were not within the ambit of the NLRB’s expertise and, therefore, the 
NLRB’s decision was not entitled to deference from the Court.111 The 
Court noted that IRCA made workplace immigration enforcement 
central to immigration policy.112 Changes in the 1986 law included the 
establishment of an employer verification system, the imposition of 
civil and criminal penalties for knowingly hiring undocumented 
workers, and a prohibition on the use of false documents to obtain 
employment.113 The Court noted: 
Under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented 
alien to obtain employment in the United States without some 
party directly contravening explicit congressional policies. 
Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent 
identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCA’s 
enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the 
undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA 
obligations.114 
In this instance of potentially contravening federal policies, the 
Court found that the agency’s adherence to one federal policy 
potentially undermined the other.115 It noted that the federal law 
established the penalties for fraudulent identification to obtain work 
and that the NLRB’s position would undermine immigration policy, 
including the policy stated in the statute to criminalize the use of 
fraudulent documents for work.116 The Court’s reasoning left the 
federalism structure intact: Because the policies under review were 
both federal, the Court did not need to address the preemptive 
 
 108. Id. at 141. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 141–42. 
 111. Id. at 149. 
 112. Id. at 147–48. 
 113. Id.; Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3360–63 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)). 
 114. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 148. 
 115. Id. at 149. 
 116. Id. at 150–51. 
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authority of the federal government over the states in immigration 
regulation. 
2.  Flores-Figueroa v. United States (2009) 
In this case, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal 
aggravated identity theft statute that is mirrored in many state 
identity theft laws.117 The provision imposes a mandatory jail sentence 
for certain predicate crimes if the accused “knowingly . . . uses, 
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person.”118 The statute requires proof that the defendant committed a 
predicate crime involving some sort of fraud.119 The predicate crimes 
listed in the statute include immigration violations in which the 
federal government is the victim of the fraudulent activity, such as the 
use of counterfeit visas to seek entry into the United States.120 
Notably, however, none of the enumerated predicate crimes 
specifically involve the use of false Social Security numbers to obtain 
work.121 After his employer reported to ICE that Flores-Figueroa had 
submitted a counterfeit Social Security number and alien registration 
cards, the federal government charged him with two immigration 
offenses.122 The immigration offenses included entering the United 
States without inspection and misusing immigration documents.123 
The government also charged him with aggravated identity theft, the 
crime at issue in the case.124 
Using statutory interpretation methods, the Supreme Court held 
that the provision requires the government to show that the 
defendant knew that the identity he was using actually belonged to 
another person.125 The mere use of a false Social Security number for 
 
 117. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(a) (2012) (creating additional penalties for identity theft committed in connection 
with certain enumerated felonies). For an example of such a state statute, see ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-2009 (2010). 
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). 
 119. Id. § 1028A(a), (c). 
 120. Id. § 1028A(c); see also id. § 1546(a) (prescribing fine or imprisonment for up to 
twenty-five years for creating counterfeit visas).  
 121. Id. § 1028A(c).  
 122. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 649. 
 123. Id. (noting charges for violation of 8 U.S.C. §1325(a), entrance without inspection, 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), misuse of immigration documents). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 657. 
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identification purposes, in other words, was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction.126 
While the Court did not dwell on the predicate immigration 
offenses at issue in the case, they are important for their focus on the 
federal government as the victim of these offenses. In each of the 
predicate offenses—entry without authorization and misusing 
immigration documents—the fraud is alleged to be against the 
government and not against an individual.127 Through these identity 
theft statutes, Congress has spoken as to the level and degree of 
sanction for using false documents before the federal government.128 
Like employer sanctions in the immigration statute, in other words, 
Congress has circumscribed when a defendant should face an 
aggravated identity theft conviction for immigration violations. Both 
of these offenses are clearly immigration-related.129 Entering the 
United States without inspection is a misdemeanor offense that 
carries a six-month sentence and a fine if convicted.130 Misusing 
immigration documents for an immigration benefit is much more 
circumscribed than general document fraud and specifically affects 
the federal government’s regulation of immigration. 
3.  Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting (2011) 
In this case, the Supreme Court used statutory interpretation 
principles to interpret the licensing exception of the employer 
sanctions provisions of IRCA in favor of state regulation.131 The 
provision at issue preempts “any State or local law imposing civil or 
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”132 The Arizona 
legislature passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act133 providing that 
the licenses of employers who knowingly hired undocumented 
workers would be suspended or revoked.134 The Court read the 
 
 126. See id. at 647 (holding that the aggravated identity theft statute requires 
knowledge that the “means of identification . . . belonged to another” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012) (entering the United States without inspection); 18 
U.S.C. § 1546(a) (misusing immigration documents). 
 128. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
 129. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
 130. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a). 
 131. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011). 
 132. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 
3359, 3368 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)). 
 133. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified as 
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, -212, -212.01 (2010)). 
 134. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212.F.1.(d), -212.F.2. 
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federal statute as expressly exempting from preemption the type of 
statute that Arizona implemented because it was within the exception 
that Congress provided in the federal statute.135 
Notably, the Court’s rationale referred both to the federal power 
to regulate immigration and the state’s authority to regulate the 
employment relationship to protect workers within the state.136 The 
Court noted that this shared authority was much clearer before 
Congress enacted IRCA in 1986 and occupied the field of 
immigration regulation in the workplace through its employer 
sanctions provisions.137 The Court’s opinion provides some guidance 
about the preemptive authority of congressional action.138 Here, the 
Court noted that Congress specifically exempted licensing power 
from its worksite immigration enforcement scheme.139 This exemption 
made state regulation of business licenses possible.140 
 While the Court’s opinion may seem to offer broad powers to 
the states to regulate at the intersection of state police power and 
immigration regulation, its subsequent opinion in Arizona v. United 
States141 reinforced the principle of federal authority over immigration 
regulation and its preemptive power. 
4.  Arizona v. United States (2012) 
Importantly, in Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court 
struck down a state law provision criminalizing unlawful work for 
employees.142 The majority reasoned that because the purpose of the 
employer sanctions provision was to sanction the employer and not 
the employee, and because congressional action preempts state action 
when it comes to workplace immigration regulation, the state’s 
employee sanctions provision was invalid.143 The Court noted that 
“[p]roposals to make unauthorized work a criminal offense were 
debated and discussed during the long process of drafting 
IRCA . . . [b]ut Congress rejected them.”144 State efforts to circumvent 
 
 135. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973. 
 136. Id. at 1974. 
 137. Id. at 1974–75. 
 138. See id. at 1977–87. 
 139. Id. at 1977–78. 
 140. Id. at 1987. 
 141. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 142. Id. at 2510. 
 143. Id. at 2505. 
 144. Id. at 2504 (citation omitted). 
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congressional intent by criminalizing work based on immigration 
status are, therefore, preempted.145 
Justice Scalia, in dissent, notably argued that for structural 
constitutional and extra-constitutional reasons (including the need to 
balance federal sovereignty with the sovereignty of the states), the 
states should be allowed to regulate immigrants’ workplace activity.146 
Scalia argued that the majority made unsupported assumptions about 
congressional intent in deciding that state employee sanctions are 
preempted.147 Commenting on the significance that the majority 
placed on Congress’s 1986 efforts to penalize employers for the hiring 
of undocumented workers, he noted that express preemption over 
employer sanctions does not necessarily preclude state regulation.148 
Instead, specifically preempting punishment for employers implies a 
lack of preemption for those who seek employment.149 
Justice Scalia provided an alternative reading of congressional 
intent in implementing employer sanctions provisions at the same 
time that Congress rejected employee sanctions: 
There is no more reason to believe that this rejection was 
expressive of a desire that there be no sanctions on employees, 
than expressive of a desire that such sanctions be left to the 
States. To tell the truth, it was most likely expressive of what 
inaction ordinarily expresses: nothing at all.150 
Justice Scalia’s dissent signals deep divisions about the roles of the 
states and the federal government in immigration regulation. It also 
provides fodder for states’ arguments that they should be able to 
enforce criminal identity theft statutes for false use of Social Security 
numbers as a form of employee sanction because of congressional 
silence on the issue. 
While the Court struck down the Arizona provision criminalizing 
unauthorized work,151 the question remains as to the effect of Arizona 
v. United States on similar efforts to regulate immigration through 
other state laws. Arizona’s own statute criminalizing use of false 
identity to obtain work152 is currently being challenged by a group of 
 
 145. Id. at 2505. 
 146. See id. at 2511–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 147. Id. at 2514. 
 148. Id. at 2519–20. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2520. 
 151. Id. at 2505 (majority opinion). 
 152. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2008(A), 13-2009(A)(3) (2010). 
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individuals and immigrant organizations, and a federal district court 
has issued a preliminary injunction against its enforcement.153 
F. The Criminalization of Identity Theft and the Victimization of 
Individuals at the Federal Level: The Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 
Congress arguably left open the possibility for states to regulate 
immigration through identity theft statutes by amending the federal 
identity theft statute to provide broader protections for individuals. 
This section explores Congress’s amendments and its intent. 
In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act,154 aimed at providing remedies to individual victims 
of identity theft or fraud.155 According to the Senate Report on the 
1998 legislation, the previous versions of identity theft statutes did not 
provide effective remedies to individuals but instead focused on the 
effects of fraud or identity theft on institutions such as banks, credit 
card companies, and the federal government.156 The previous versions 
of the statute also focused on theft of documents rather than the 
other forms of acquiring and appropriating individuals’ identity 
information.157 The 1998 Act added to the existing identity theft 
statute a provision prohibiting: 
knowingly transfer[ring], possess[ing], or us[ing], without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person with the 
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that 
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a 
felony under any applicable State or local law.158 
This provision, therefore, effectively expanded potential victimhood 
to persons whose identity was used in the commission of any federal 
crime or state or local felony.159 
The 1998 Act expanded the scope of identity theft in another 
important way. The previous version of the statute made the transfer, 
production, or possession of fraudulent documents a federal crime if 
 
 153. Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, No. CV-01356-PHX-DCG, 2015 WL 58671, at *1 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 5, 2015) (granting a preliminary injunction).  
 154. Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028 (2012)). 
 155. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4–8 (1998). 
 156. See id. at 6. 
 157. See id. at 5. 
 158. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7). 
 159. See id. 
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it affected interstate commerce or the mails.160 The 1998 amendments 
added the “use” of fraudulent “means of identification” to the 
definition of document and identity fraud, expanding the ambit of 
potential criminal defendants.161 The Senate Report stated that “such 
inclusion automatically makes identity information crimes subject to 
the exclusion (section 212(a)(2)) and deportation (section 237(a)(2)) 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”162 While 
Congress understood the immigration consequences of this provision 
of the statute, it saw no need to interfere with its already-existing 
penalty structure for employment verification fraud.163 
The expansion of the federal identity theft crime has facilitated 
the construction of the identity theft victim as anyone whose personal 
information has been used in any way. In other words, the taking of 
identity includes the taking of anything virtual or otherwise that 
might elicit the essence of that person. The federal statute continues 
to require, as an element of the crime, an unlawful taking of a benefit 
such as money, credit, or services. Arguably, there is no taking of a 
benefit in the act of using a false Social Security number to obtain 
employment. 
Anti-immigrant sentiment often drives attempts to categorize the 
use of false identity for work as a crime. After the identity theft law 
was enacted in 1998, advocates continued to seek a specific statutory 
provision that addressed false use of Social Security numbers 
specifically for work.164 Advocates such as the Center for Immigration 
Studies (“CIS”) have been outspoken in their intent to target 
immigrants with this provision.165 The CIS, for example, in a recent 
call for further changes to the federal identity theft statute, noted that 
the fraudulent use of identity information for work was one form of 
identity theft that native-born individuals do not commit: 
Illegal aliens engage in varieties of identity fraud Americans are 
unlikely to commit, including illegally applying for U.S. IDs 
 
 160. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 10–11. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. See RONALD W. MORTENSEN, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, ILLEGAL, BUT 
NOT UNDOCUMENTED: IDENTITY THEFT, DOCUMENT FRAUD, AND ILLEGAL 
EMPLOYMENT 16 (June 2009), available at http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/ 
2009/back809.pdf. 
 165. See id. 
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such [as] passports or driver’s licenses, as well as using those 
IDs to obtain jobs they are not authorized to have.166 
The CIS concluded its analysis of identity fraud by noting that 
the statute should clearly state that use of identity information for 
work-related purposes is a crime.167 It called for a “fix” to the statute 
that would “ensure persons who commit identity theft or fraud for the 
purpose of unauthorized employment or hiring or harboring 
unauthorized employees are punishable under both [18 U.S.C.] 
Sections 1028 and 1028A.”168 Such a fix would actually change the 
scope of the statute and redefine and expand the traditional forms of 
identity theft to reach false use of a Social Security number for work. 
Nothing in the statute currently requires such an interpretation.169 
Moreover, while the legislative history makes mention of immigration 
fraud, it does not list the false use of Social Security numbers for 
employment as a specific danger it seeks to avoid.170 
The CIS position does not make sense in the context of a system 
intended to focus on the harm to the institution or person receiving 
and processing the information (i.e., the bank, the credit card 
company, or the government) due to the unlawful appropriation of a 
benefit (i.e., money, credit, or services).171 In the workplace context, 
the use of false identifying information is collateral to the employer-
employee relationship,172 which is itself more of a contract for labor 
than an exchange of benefits. The nature of the employment 
relationship, in other words, takes the use of false identifying 
information to obtain work outside the realm of the Identity Fraud 
and Assumption Deterrence Act, which addresses the harm to an 
individual related to the taking of a benefit.173 Nothing in the federal 
 
 166. Kephart, supra note 6, at 2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2012) (requiring intent to “commit, or to aid or abet, 
or in connection with” a violation of federal law or a felony under state or local law). 
 170. Cf. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 7–8 (1998) (describing several forms of identity theft, 
including theft of information for nefarious reasons such as the usurpation of a person’s 
credit or financial accounts, or to run up debt). Notably, the Report does not allude to the 
false use of Social Security numbers for work as a danger that the Senate sought to protect 
against. See id. 
 171. See supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text. 
 172. Arguably, the master-servant relationship is a form of a contractual relationship in 
which a service is exchanged for payment. The identity of the parties does not define the 
relationship as much as the exchange of payment for services. 
 173. Cf. S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4–6 (1998) (identifying Act’s purpose as preventing 
theft of identifying information for purposes of racking up victims’ credit card debt or 
facilitating organized crime, but not for obtaining work).  
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statute explicitly changes the comprehensive workplace immigration 
regulation scheme created and refined by Congress over the years.174 
Even when Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, it understood that false use of Social Security numbers 
for work should not be penalized.175 Accordingly, Congress amended 
the Social Security fraud provisions to ensure that immigrants 
legalized under the 1986 Act would not run afoul of those 
provisions.176 
Nonetheless, since the passage of the Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act, states have enacted provisions in their 
identity theft statutes to cover the false use of identifying information 
for work. Arguably, convictions under these statutes can be treated as 
felonies relating to immigration offenses, which are considered 
aggravated felonies under the federal aggravated identity theft 
statute.177 The following Part describes state efforts to expand the 
definition of identity theft to cover immigration regulation in the 
workplace. 
II.  THE STATES’ ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE “WRONGFUL” 
DOCUMENTATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
A. State Identity Theft Statutes 
Over the past decade or so, states have enacted or amended 
identity theft statutes to criminalize the false use of Social Security 
numbers or other identifying information for employment. Such laws 
are ostensibly and sometimes explicitly aimed at reserving jobs for the 
native-born, majority-white populations in those states.178 These laws 
have been enacted in the midst of growing rhetoric that immigrants 
are “taking our jobs,” a frustration with the federal government’s 
 
 174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 
 175. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(e). 
 176. Id. (exempting certain noncitizens from the definition of fraud under the Social 
Security Act). 
 177. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of state statutes creating identity theft felonies. 
The federal aggravated identity theft statute states that conviction of a felony that can be 
categorized as a felony relating to immigration offenses is an aggravated felony. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(10). 
 178. See Nigel Duara, Judge Blocks Arizona ID Theft Law Targeting Job-Seeking 
Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-arizona-
immigrants-20150106-story.html (describing how the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 
Department used the Arizona identity theft statute to target undocumented immigrants in 
the workplace). See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707 (1993) (providing a critical-race-theory analysis of the ways in which laws and the 
legal system maintain white privilege in the form of rights and property). 
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failure to effectively control the border, and a growing sense of moral 
superiority over those who have the “wrong documents.”179 Against 
this background of rhetoric against undocumented immigration, the 
criminalization of false identities for work has infiltrated the state 
criminal regulation landscape, either through legislation, judicial 
opinions, or both. This section explores these laws and their possible 
effects on workplace relations and on the environment created in the 
shadow of the law in immigrant workplaces. 
To date, eleven states—Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, 
Utah, and Wisconsin—have enacted laws or amended already-
existing laws to define identity theft as the use of false identifying 
information to obtain employment.180 All have passed such statutes 
since the enactment of the federal Identity Theft and Assumption 
Deterrence Act.181 Of these eleven states, five—Alabama, Arizona, 
Georgia, South Carolina, and Utah182—also passed general anti-
 
 179. For an example of such rhetoric see Illegal Aliens Taking U.S. Jobs, FED’N FOR 
AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-aliens-taking-u-s-jobs (last 
updated Mar. 2013). 
 180. Act of May 14, 2012, No. 2012-368, 2012 Ala. Acts 919, 920 (codified as amended 
at ALA. CODE § 13A-8-192 (2012)); Legal Ariz. Workers Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 1312 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211, -212, -212.01 
(2010)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, § 4, 2011 Ga. 
Laws 794, 800 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-121.1 (2011)); Act of Apr. 21, 2003, ch. 
49, § 1, 2003 Iowa Acts 92, 92 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 715A.8 (2015)); Act 
of June 30, 2006, No. 246, § 5, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 687, 687 (codified as amended at 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.65 (2006)); Act of April 24, 2003, ch. 562, § 8, 2003 Miss. Laws 
968, 975 (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-19 (2011)); Act of May 26, 
2009, § 10, 2009 Neb. Laws 252, 255–56 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-638 
(Supp. 2014)); Act of Mar. 27, 2013, ch. 107, § 1, 2013 N.D. Laws 413, 413–14 (codified as 
amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2013)); Financial Identity Fraud and Identity 
Theft Protection Act, No. 190, § 8, 2008 S.C. Acts 1583, 1608–09 (codified as amended at 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-13-510 (2013)); Act of Feb. 13, 2009, ch. 164, § 1, 2009 Utah Laws 
623, 623 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-1102 (West 2009)); Act of July 
24, 2003, No. 36, § 22, 2003 Wis. Sess. Laws 465, 468 (codified as amended at WIS. STAT 
§ 943.201 (2015)). 
 181. See supra note 180. This Article discusses the redefinition of identity theft to 
include the use of false information to obtain work. Some states, such as Missouri and 
Minnesota, have instead, or also, interpreted their forgery statutes to criminalize the use of 
false information to obtain work instead. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Reynua, 807 N.W.2d 473, 
477–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting state forgery law to include the use of false 
documents to obtain employment); Missouri v. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d 5, 9–10 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2013) (holding that state forgery law was not preempted by federal immigration 
where a job applicant used a false Social Security number). Iowa criminalizes the use of 
false information to obtain work in both its forgery and identity theft statutes. See IOWA 
CODE § 715.A8(2) (2003). 
 182. Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, No. 2011-535, 
2011 Ala. Laws 888 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-30, 32-6-9 (2011)) 
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immigration statutes.183 These state legislatures explicitly targeted 
unauthorized immigration as they enacted identity theft provisions 
related to obtaining work. For example, the statute amending 
Arizona’s identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes was 
entitled “Employment of Unauthorized Aliens.”184 The Georgia 
statute was entitled the “Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Enforcement Act of 2011.”185 As these statutory titles demonstrate, 
the intent as well as the effect of the legislatures was to criminalize 
immigrants’ use of “wrong” documents in the workplace, regardless 
of harm to any particular victim. 
In a particularly expansive move, several states have defined 
identity theft to include the use of a dead or fictitious person’s 
identity. The Arizona statute criminalizes knowingly taking or 
possessing the identifying information of a real, fictitious, or dead 
 
(providing for various anti-immigration measures); Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections 
of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)) (requiring, among other measures, 
“a reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status of the person” “for any 
lawful stop, detention or arrest” by law enforcement officials “where reasonable suspicion 
exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States”); Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. Laws 794 (codified 
in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. (2011)) (providing for various anti-immigration 
legislation, including authorizing law enforcement officers to investigate immigration 
status of certain individuals); Act of June 27, 2011, No. 69, 2011 S.C. Acts 325 (codified in 
scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6, 8, 16, 17, 23, 41 (2012)) (providing for 
legislation similar to Arizona’s Act, including authorizing law enforcement officials to 
check the immigration status of certain individuals); Utah Immigration Accountability 
Enforcement Act, ch. 18, 2011 Utah Laws 228 (codified in scattered sections of UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 63G, 63I, 63J, 67, 76, 77 (West 2011)). 
 183. Bills were introduced in five states—Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, and 
Wisconsin—but they did not become law. See H.R. 629, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(Iowa 2011); H.B. 4305, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); H.R. 54, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Miss. 2011); Neb. Leg. 48, 102nd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011); A.B. 173, 100th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Wis. 2011).  
 184. Employment of Unauthorized Aliens Act, ch. 152, sec. 1, § 13-2008, 2008 Ariz. 
Sess. Laws 641, 641–42 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008 (2010)). In addition 
to adding employment to the forms of identity theft prosecutable in Arizona, the statute 
clarified the scope of the Legal Arizona Workers Act. Compare Legal Arizona Workers 
Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified as amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 23-211 to 23-214) (prohibiting employers from knowingly or intentionally hiring an 
unauthorized alien and requiring employee identity verification), with Employment of 
Unauthorized Aliens Act, ch. 152, §§ 3–6, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 641, 642–652 (codified as 
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-214) (amending Arizona statutes 
relating to employment of unauthorized aliens). The identity theft provisions are currently 
being challenged in federal court, which has issued a preliminary injunction against their 
implementation. See infra notes 276–84 and accompanying text. 
 185. 2011 Ga. Laws 794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of GA. CODE. 
ANN.). 
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person without permission to obtain or continue in employment.186 
The Georgia legislature, mirroring the Arizona legislation, enacted a 
statute similar in its expansiveness.187 Georgia’s statute created the 
offense of aggravated identity fraud if a person “willfully and 
fraudulently uses any counterfeit or fictitious identifying information 
concerning a real, fictitious, or deceased person with intent to use 
such counterfeit or fictitious identifying information for the purpose 
of obtaining employment.”188 This expansion goes beyond the federal 
statute in two ways. First, it punishes the use of a fictitious person’s 
identity. Second, it punishes the use of such identity for employment.  
Five states—Nebraska, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Michigan, and 
North Dakota—have enacted or amended statutes that criminalize 
the false use of identifying information for employment as identity 
theft independently of anti-immigrant legislation.189 These statutes 
vary in their scope and breadth. Nebraska’s statute, like the Arizona 
and Georgia statutes, criminalizes the taking or possession of a real or 
fictitious person’s identifying information to obtain or continue in 
employment.190 Criminal impersonation was already in the statute 
when the Nebraska legislature added a provision criminalizing 
“[k]nowingly provid[ing] false personal identifying information or a 
false personal identification document to an employer for the purpose 
of obtaining employment.”191 Also like Arizona and Georgia, the 
Wisconsin statute, enacted in 2003, makes the use of the personal 
identifying information of an existing or dead person to obtain 
employment a felony; but, unlike those states, the Wisconsin statute 
does not penalize the use of a fictitious person’s identity.192 
Mississippi’s statute, enacted in 2003, prohibits obtaining another 
 
 186. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008. This definition is more expansive than the 
definition that the Supreme Court endorsed in Flores-Figueroa. There, the Court decided 
that to qualify for an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, the defendant had to 
know that the Social Security number he was using actually belonged to someone else. See 
supra Part I.E.2. 
 187. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, No. 252, 2011 Ga. 
Laws 794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of GA. CODE. ANN.).  
 188. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-9-121.1 (2011). 
 189. Act of June 30, 2006, No. 246, 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 687 (codified as amended at 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.65 (2006)); Act of April 24, 2003, ch. 562, § 8, 2003 Miss. Laws 
968, 975–76 (codified as amended at MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-19 (2011)); Act of May 26, 
2009, No. 155, § 10, 2009 Neb. Laws 252, 255–56 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-638 (Supp. 2014)); Act of March 27, 2013, ch. 107, 2013 N.D. Laws 413 (codified at N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2013)); Act of July 24, 2003, No. 36, §§ 15–24, 2003 Wis. Sess. 
Laws 465, 467–68 (codified at WIS. STAT. §§ 943.201 to 943.203 (2015)). 
 190. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-639 (Supp. 2014). 
 191. Id. § 28-638. 
 192. See WIS. STAT. § 943.201. 
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person’s identifying information with the intent to unlawfully use the 
information for employment.193 Michigan’s statute, enacted in 2004, 
prohibits the use of personal identifying information of another with 
intent to defraud or violate the law to obtain employment.194 
Whether or not as part of anti-immigration legislation, state 
legislatures have come to define identity theft much more broadly in 
the last decade or so. The legislative history of the North Dakota 
identity theft statute is a clear illustration of the change in perspective 
on the use of false Social Security numbers for work by immigrants.195 
The statute states that a person is guilty of identity theft “if the person 
uses or attempts to use any personal identifying information of an 
individual, living or deceased, without the authorization or consent of 
the individual, in order . . . to obtain or continue employment.”196 The 
previous statute criminalized the unauthorized use of a person’s 
identifying information to obtain credit, services, or something of 
value without consent or through misrepresentation about consent.197 
When the bill amending the then-existing statute was introduced in 
January 2013, the amendment added a criminal penalty for using the 
personal identifying information of another to interfere with a 
contractual or service agreement.198 Although the proposed 
amendment did not originally include the use of personal identifying 
information to obtain employment, it was changed to include the 
“obtain or continue employment” language and reintroduced on 
January 30, 2013.199 The testimony of P. Grossman, Director of the 
Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division of the Office of the 
Attorney General, to the Senate Judiciary Committee explains why 
his office supported the amendment to the bill: 
The landscape has changed since the identity theft statute was 
first enacted. At that time ID theft involved the theft of 
 
 193. Act of Apr. 24, 2003, ch. 562, § 8, 2003 Miss. Laws 968, 975–76 (codified at MISS. 
CODE. ANN. § 97-45-17). 
 194. Identity Theft Protection Act, No. 452, § 5, 2004 Mich. Pub. Acts 1856, 1857 
(codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 445.61 to 445.77). 
 195. See H.B. No. 1280, Legislative History, 63rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), 
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/63-2013/library/hb1280.pdf?20140609095843 
(containing testimony and minutes relating to the proposed anti-theft statute). 
 196. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2013). 
 197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-11 (2011) (amended 2013); see also Bill Versions for 
House Bill 1280, N.D. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-
2013/bill-index/bi1280.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2015) (providing information and 
marked-up version of House Bill 1280). 
 198. See H.B. No. 1280, Legislative History, 63rd Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013), 
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/resource/63-2013/library/hb1280.pdf?20140609095843. 
 199. See id. 
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personal identifying information for monetary or financial gain. 
Now, identities are stolen for other purposes, including 
obtaining employment, initiating or cancelling service contracts, 
committing a criminal offense in another person’s name, or 
impersonating an individual by e-mail, website, or social media 
to harass, harm, defraud, intimidate or threaten another 
person.200 
The bill essentially made it easier to prosecute the “wrongful” use of 
documents by eliminating the element of economic loss to the 
individual whose identifying information has been used. This type of 
expansion of the identity theft definition—here, and in the other 
statutes described above—facilitates an understanding of the false use 
of a Social Security number for work as a form of theft, even when 
the individual victim has suffered no real economic harm. 
B. Other State Criminal Offenses 
While this Article focuses on identity theft statutes, it deserves 
mentioning that states have enacted criminal statutes that apply more 
broadly to the use of false Social Security numbers. In Idaho, for 
example, the legislature amended an existing law to make it a crime 
to knowingly make a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation in an attestation or to knowingly provide a false Social 
Security number.201 In Utah, the legislature enacted a statute directing 
state agencies to use DHS databases to verify the lawful presence of 
individuals applying for federal, state, or local benefits, licenses, or 
home loans.202 Minnesota and Missouri both have forgery statutes 
that courts have interpreted as applying to false information to obtain 
work.203 False citizenship claims are considered criminal offenses 
under these statutes.204 
California’s penal code includes a general statute criminalizing 
false claims to citizenship or alien status.205 This provision was 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Act of Apr. 11, 2011, ch. 281, § 1, 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws 760, 762 (codified at 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-7903 (2012)). 
 202. Construction Licensees Related Amendments, ch. 413, § 14, 2011 Utah Laws 2932, 
2953 (codified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-11-104 (West 2011)). 
 203. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Reynua, 807 N.W.2d 473, 476–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) 
(interpreting state forgery law to include the use of certain false documents to obtain 
employment); Missouri v. Diaz-Rey, 397 S.W.3d 5, 7 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a 
job applicant who uses forged documents—such as a Social Security card—may commit 
the crime of forgery under state law). 
 204. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 171.22 (West 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 575.060 (West 2014). 
 205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (West 2014). 
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originally enacted through the initiative process as part of California’s 
Proposition 187 in 1995.206 That proposition was focused on limiting 
immigrant use of public government resources.207 This provision 
survived the constitutional challenge that defeated much of the rest of 
the proposition,208 providing an impetus for states to consider 
criminalizing immigration-related behavior. The California statute 
was re-enrolled into the Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011, 
which amended the penal code to define as a felony the use of false 
documentation to conceal citizenship or alien status.209 These statutes 
focus on the outcome of false use of Social Security numbers, rather 
than the act itself. They criminalize the use of false information to 
make citizenship claims or to hide immigration status. In this way, 
even though they are general in nature, states can use these statutes 
to target use of false Social Security numbers in the workplace. 
C. Judicial Opinions Interpreting General Identity Theft Statutes 
At the judicial level, at least ten state courts have begun to 
interpret general identity theft laws (those that do not explicitly 
criminalize the use of false identifying information for employment) 
to include the use of false identifying information for work.210 In each 
of the cases, the courts view false use of identifying information as a 
form of theft in which such information is used to fraudulently obtain 
a benefit such as credit, money, goods, services, or other property, or 
simply to commit unlawful activity.211 Sometimes, as in the case of 
Colorado, the courts merely state in dictum or assume without 
holding, that using false identity documents to obtain employment 
 
 206. Cal. Prop. 187, §§ 2, 3 (1994), available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2103&context=ca_ballot_props; Jeffrey R. Margolis, Closing the 
Doors to the Land of Opportunity: The Constitutional Controversy Surrounding 
Proposition 187, 26 MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 376–77 (1995). 
 207. See Margolis, supra note 206, at 367–69.  
 208. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
 209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (“Any person who uses false documents to conceal his 
or her true citizenship or resident alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by 
imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for five years or by a fine of 
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).”). 
 210. Case law in California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New York, 
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin have found that the false use of identifying 
information for employment is a crime covered by the state’s general identity theft statute. 
See infra Part II.C.2. 
 211. See, e.g., State v. Madrigal, 776 N.W.2d 301, No. 08-1623, 2009 WL 3086558 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table decision). 
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violates existing general identity theft statutes.212 In other cases, the 
courts make arguments that describe how the use of false Social 
Security numbers in the workplace violates the general statute.213 
These arguments focus on two main elements of the crime. The courts 
either define the harm element by interpreting employment as a form 
of money, services or property, or they focus on the “intent to harm” 
element, interpreting the actual use of false information as proof of 
intent without regard to actual harm or injury. This section discusses 
how the courts analyze these elements. 
1.  Interpreting Employment as Money, Services, or Property 
The prototypical case comes from Wisconsin, where the 
defendant was convicted under the general identity theft statute214 for 
using false identity documents for work.215 The defendant argued that 
there was no intrinsic benefit or value in a job offer, as that is only the 
opportunity for work, and not a benefit in and of itself.216 The court 
did not agree and instead noted that what the worker “ultimately 
sought and obtained was the compensation and other economic 
benefits that flowed from the employment. Obviously these were 
things of value within the meaning of [Wisconsin Identity Theft 
Statute].”217 
The same type of analysis has occurred in courts in Iowa, Illinois, 
and Kansas. In Iowa, for example, where the legislature enacted both 
an identity forgery statute and an identity theft statute, the courts 
have interpreted these statutes to prohibit the use of false information 
 
 212. See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 944 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) 
(suppressing evidence regarding the use of a false Social Security number for work 
because there was no probable cause and assuming that such false use of a Social Security 
number would violate the state’s identity theft laws); see also Peopla v. Perez, No. 
10CA0587, 2013 WL 1908991, at *8 (Colo. App. 2013) (holding that the prosecution failed 
to present evidence that a false Social Security number provided the defendant the ability 
to work or that the employer could not have hired him without a valid Social Security 
number), cert. granted, No. 13SC465, 2013 WL 6795153 (Colo. Dec. 23, 2013).  
 213. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of how courts determine that false use of 
Social Security numbers for employment violates general identity theft statutes. 
 214. WIS. STAT. § 943.201(2) (2015) (“Whoever intentionally uses or attempts to use 
any personal identifying information or personal identification document of an individual 
to obtain credit, money, goods, services or anything else of value without the authorization 
or consent of the individual and by representing that he or she is the individual or is acting 
with the authorization or consent of the individual is guilty of a Class D felony.”). 
 215. See State v. Ramirez, 2001 WI App 158, ¶ 18, 633 N.W.2d 656, 662. 
 216. See id. ¶ 7, 633 N.W.2d at 659. 
 217. Id. ¶ 7, 633 N.W.2d at 659–60. 
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to obtain work. In State v. Madrigal,218 the Iowa Court of Appeals 
reviewed an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for a defendant 
convicted of the identity theft statute, which, in relevant part, reads, 
“A person commits the offense of identity theft if the person 
fraudulently uses or attempts to fraudulently use identification 
information of another person, with the intent to obtain credit, 
property, services, or other benefit.”219 In analyzing the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the court determined that the statute 
applied to Madrigal’s use of another’s identity to obtain work.220 In 
the court’s words, “[t]he purchase of the identity information is not 
criminalized, but it is the subsequent acts of fraudulently using it to 
obtain a benefit that are penalized.”221 The court then explained that 
employment was in and of itself a benefit.222 
The Illinois Appellate Court evaluated a general identity fraud 
statute that has since been repealed223 and replaced with a nearly 
identical statute.224 In People v. Montoya,225 the court held that the 
defendant “ ‘fraudulently obtained’ both money and services . . .” 
during the course of her employment in violation of the statute, 
merely by posing as someone else to obtain work.226 The current 
statute states that “a person commits identity theft when he or she 
knowingly . . . uses any personal identifying information or personal 
identification document of another person to fraudulently obtain 
credit, money, goods, services, or other property.”227 While the 
current statute does not explicitly criminalize the use of a false 
identity to obtain employment, case law interpreting the previous and 
very similar statute includes employment in the interpretation of the 
term “money or services.”228 
 
 218. 776 N.W.2d 301, No. 08-1623, 2009 WL 3086558 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 219. IOWA CODE § 715A.8(2) (2015). 
 220. See Madrigal, 2009 WL 3086558, at *1–2. 
 221. Id. at *2. 
 222. Id. at *2 n.4 (“Section 715A.8(2) [of the Iowa Code] applies when the person 
intends to obtain ‘credit, property, services, or other benefit.’ Property is defined in 
section 702.14 to include ‘anything of value.’ The wages received by Madrigal would be 
considered property under the statute.”). 
 223. People v. Montoya, 868 N.E.2d 389, 392–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see 2011 Ill. Legis. 
Serv. 97-597 (West) (repealing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16G-15(a)(q) (West 2003)). 
 224. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-30(a)(1) (West Supp. 2014). 
 225. 868 N.E.2d 389. 
 226. Id. at 394. 
 227. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-30(a)(1). 
 228. See Montoya, 868 N.E.2d at 391–94.  
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In Kansas, an appellate court interpreted the statute’s use of the 
term “property” to include the benefits of employment.229 The statute 
at the time, general in its application, referred to identity theft as 
“knowingly and with intent to defraud for economic benefit, 
obtaining, possessing, transferring, using or attempting to obtain, 
possess, transfer or use, one or more identification documents or 
personal identification number of another person other than that 
issued lawfully for the use of the possessor.”230 The statute defined 
“intent to defraud” as “an intention to deceive another person, and to 
induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, to assume, 
create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power with 
reference to property.”231 In State v. Meza,232 the defendant used 
another person’s Social Security number to induce the employer into 
believing she had employment authorization.233 In interpreting its 
general statute, the court defined the benefits surrounding 
employment as something akin to property.234 Employee benefits and 
state and federal regulatory protections, in other words, were 
property rights attached to the job.235 Like the other courts using this 
logic, by framing employment as a form of property, the court could 
easily conclude that the defendant fraudulently obtained that 
property. 
2.  Employer or Federal Government as the Victim of Fraud; Use of 
False Information as Proof of Intent to Harm 
In contrast, cases in other states have held that using someone 
else’s documents for work meets the general identity theft statute’s 
requirement for intent to harm or defraud another person.236 In these 
cases, the employer is viewed as the aggrieved party.237 In a 
prototypical case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, interpreting the 
state’s general identity theft statute,238 held that the “intent to defraud 
includes an intent to cause injury to another’s legal rights or interests” 
and concluded that misrepresentation on an I-9 form signaled intent 
 
 229. State v. Meza, 165 P.3d 298, 301–02 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
 230. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4018(a) (Supp. 2004) (repealed 2011). 
 231. Id. § 21-3110(9) (repealed 2011). 
 232. 165 P.3d 298 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
 233. Id. at 301. 
 234. Id. at 301–02. 
 235. Id. at 302. 
 236. See, e.g., State v. Alvarez-Amador, 232 P.3d 989, 992 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
 237. See, e.g., id. at 991. 
 238. OR. REV. STAT. § 165.800 (2013). 
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to defraud the federal government.239 The court also noted that the 
defendant, by misrepresenting his employment eligibility, also had 
intent to defraud the employer.240 Courts have reached similar 
conclusions in Indiana, Ohio, and Washington. In Indiana, for 
example, the appellate court focused on the harm to the employer, 
“who was subject to potential penalties for hiring a person who was 
not legally permitted to work” in finding the defendant guilty of 
identity theft.241 Likewise, in a Washington case where the defendant 
used a fictitious person’s identity, the court held that the harm to the 
employer was the employer’s inability to know the true identity of its 
employee.242 The court stated: 
Big Cherry Orchards is legally obligated to ensure that each of 
its employees has sufficient legal status to obtain employment 
in the United States. If, in fact, Mr. Tinajero was not authorized 
to work in the United States, Big Cherry Orchards could incur 
potential liability for employing him. To avoid potential 
liability, Big Cherry Orchards must know the true identity of its 
employees. Although it is unclear what Mr. Tinajero’s legal 
status was at the time that he was employed, it can be inferred 
that through his use of forged documents, he intentionally 
deprived Big Cherry Orchards of information that may have 
been material to his hiring.243 
In Ohio, the court of appeals focused on the harm to a school 
district when an employee used someone else’s Social Security 
number to obtain employment.244 The court noted that the identity 
theft statute did not require “a theft.”245 Instead, according to the 
court, it merely required a showing that “the value of the credit, 
property, services, debt, or other legal obligation involved in the 
violation is greater than $100,000” for the offense to be considered a 
felony.246 The court then noted that the legal obligation involved was 
 
 239. Alvarez-Amador, 232 P.3d at 992. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Bocanegra v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Ironically, an 
employer is not subject to federal penalties unless the employer knowingly hired an 
unauthorized employee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2012). 
 242. State v. Tinajero, 228 P.3d 1282, 1284–85 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
 243. Id. (citations omitted). In this case the court interpreted the state’s statute, which 
states, “A person is guilty of unlawful possession of fictitious identification if the person 
possesses a personal identification card with a fictitious person’s identification with intent 
to use such identification card to commit . . . forgery.” WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. 
§ 9A.56.320(4) (West 2013). 
 244. State v. Roberts, 2005-Ohio-28U, 2005 WL 23358, at ¶¶ 32–42. 
 245. Id. ¶ 39. 
 246. Id. 
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the money that the school district paid the employee for her services, 
which totaled more than $100,000.247 
In California, one court analyzed the identity theft statute to 
include the use of false identifying information even if there is no 
intent to harm a victim and no harm is caused.248 A California 
appellate court reasoned that use of false identifying information was 
in and of itself a harm that the legislature meant to remedy.249 This 
holding is broad enough to cover the false use of a Social Security 
number to obtain work. 
As shown in this analysis of court arguments, when courts show 
their reasoning, they tend to interpret the general statutes in one of 
two ways. When statutes require the taking of a benefit—such as 
money, services, or property—as an element, the courts will interpret 
employment as a form of benefit covered under the statute. When the 
statute requires intent to harm, courts will read the actual use of false 
information as proof of intent, sometimes without regard to harm or 
injury. 
The courts’ rationales for applying general identity theft statutes 
in the workplace mirror the arguments of legislatures that have 
specifically defined use of false information in the workplace as 
identity theft. The very act of using false information to obtain work 
is considered fraud, with or without a specific harm to a victim, in 
states with companion anti-immigrant statutes. The harm is assumed 
in these statutes—whether it be the loss of jobs otherwise available to 
state residents, or the injury to an employer that does not know the 
true identity of its worker. Alternatively, employment takes the place 
of money, services, or property, as a form of benefit at risk of theft. 
Applying identity theft statutes in the workplace has dire 
consequences for immigrants. Not only do they face removal—a 
possible desired consequence of such statutes—but they are 
vulnerable to workplace exploitation. The following section describes 
such consequences. 
 
 247. Id. 
 248. People v. Hagedorn, 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 879, 887–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). 
 249. See id. The court noted that “[i]n light of the indisputable evil to be remedied with 
respect to identity theft, the Legislature rationally appears to have concluded that 
willfulness, when coupled with use for an unlawful purpose, provides a sufficient mens rea 
for the offense, and that no injurious intent or result is required.” Id. 
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D. Potential Problems with Expanding State Definitions of Identity 
Theft to Include the Workplace 
The problems with expanding state definitions are two-fold. 
First, criminalization of the false use of Social Security numbers for 
employment subjects immigrant workers to both criminal and 
immigration sanctions. Second, it makes immigrant workers even 
more vulnerable to workplace exploitation. This section reviews the 
consequences of criminalization for immigrant workers. 
1.  Criminalization of Immigration-Related Activities Subjects 
Immigrant Workers to Both Criminal and Immigration Sanctions 
Scholars writing at the intersection of immigration and criminal 
law have noted the consequences of increasing criminalization of 
immigrant identity and immigration-related activity.250 There are 
several ways that the overlap between immigration and criminal law 
affects immigrants. At the federal level, undocumented immigrants 
especially face criminal sanctions for immigration-related activity 
such as illegal entry into the United States, illegal re-entry after 
deportation, or smuggling.251 The imposition of new sanctions and the 
expansion of existing sanctions have exponentially increased the 
numbers of immigration-related convictions in the federal system.252 
Immigration crimes “now constitute over half of the federal criminal 
workload.”253 Illegal re-entry convictions made up a significant 
portion of the 100,000 immigration prosecutions in fiscal year 2013.254 
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (“TRAC”), a data 
gathering organization at Syracuse University, lists over thirty federal 
 
 250. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime 
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1831 (2007); Teresa A. Miller, 
Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 616 (2003) (describing scholars’ efforts documenting the trend to 
criminalize immigrants); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and 
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2006). 
 251. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (2010). 
 252. See id. 
 253. See id. at 1281–82; see also David Alan Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc 
Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 166–75 (2012) (documenting the rise of 
federal immigration prosecutions). 
 254. See At Nearly 100,000, Immigration Prosecutions Reach All-Time High in FY 2013: 
Illegal Re-entry Prosecutions Jump 76% During Obama Administration, 
TRACIMMIGRATION (Nov. 25, 2013), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/336/. 
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criminal statutes most frequently used in immigration prosecutions.255 
These include identity theft and aggravated identity theft.256 
Another form of overlap between immigration and criminal law 
involves the ways in which state criminal violations and convictions 
increasingly carry immigration consequences, regardless of 
congressional intent. The most dire immigration consequences 
involve removability for running afoul of one of several enumerated 
deportability or inadmissibility grounds in the immigration statute.257 
With respect to identity theft convictions, a noncitizen can be 
removed for a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or an 
aggravated felony involving fraud or theft.258 Some courts have held 
convictions for identity theft crimes to be crimes involving moral 
turpitude under the immigration statute.259 The Ninth Circuit, for 
example, recently upheld the finding of an Arizona district court that 
a conviction under the Arizona identity theft statute for use of 
another person’s identification was a crime of moral turpitude.260 In 
that case, the defendant was found guilty of identity theft for using 
another person’s Social Security number to obtain employment.261 An 
identity theft conviction can also be an aggravated felony, as defined 
by the immigration statute: the statute makes a noncitizen deportable 
for an aggravated felony conviction if she is convicted of a theft 
offense for which the sentence exceeds one year,262 and a noncitizen 
can also be deportable for a crime involving fraud or deceit for which 
the loss to the victim (or to the federal government) exceeds ten 
thousand dollars.263 Criminalization of false use of Social Security 
numbers for work could have elements that match either one of these 
deportable crimes. 
 
 255. Criminal Statutes Most Frequently Used in Immigration Prosecution, 
TRACIMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/aboutLaw/ (last visited Apr. 28, 
2015). 
 256. See id. 
 257. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)–(10), 1227 (2012) (listing the different forms of 
inadmissibility and deportability in the immigration statute).  
 258. See id. § 1182(a)(2) (providing that aliens are inadmissible if they have been 
convicted of, or admit to committing, a crime of moral turpitude); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) 
(providing that aliens are deportable if they are convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude within five years of admission); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (providing that aliens are 
deportable if they are convicted of an aggravated felony). 
 259. See, e.g., Ibarra-Hernandez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1280, 1282 (9th Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam). 
 260. Id.  
 261. Id. 
 262. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). 
 263. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(M). 
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Importantly, working without employment authorization is not, 
in and of itself, a deportability or inadmissibility ground. Because 
false use of Social Security numbers for work are not an actual 
ground for inadmissibility or deportability, a state’s criminalization of 
use of false information to obtain employment may actually 
circumvent congressional intent to sanction employers—and not 
employees—for unauthorized work.264 In the current political climate, 
however, the federal government’s priorities reflect an emphasis on 
the removal of criminal aliens.265 An undocumented worker convicted 
of identity theft under a state statute for use of a false Social Security 
number to obtain employment, therefore, now becomes a criminal 
alien subject to removal, without regard to how the sanctions in the 
workplace have shifted from employer to employee. 
A third form of overlap between immigration and criminal law 
that has immigration consequences involves interaction between the 
enforcement of state criminal laws and federal immigration 
enforcement efforts. Until recently, the federal government actively 
pursued an enforcement program it called Secure Communities, 
which called for a partnership between federal, state and local law 
enforcement agencies to identify undocumented persons under arrest 
or in custody.266 Under Secure Communities, state and local 
authorities would share fingerprints with ICE, which could take 
immigration enforcement action against priority removal targets.267 
Under Secure Communities, ICE prioritizes “the removal of 
individuals who present the most significant threats to public safety as 
determined by the severity of their crime, their criminal history, and 
other factors—as well as those who have repeatedly violated 
immigration laws.”268 The Secure Communities infrastructure exists 
today in all fifty states.269 According to ICE, more than 283,000 
convicted criminal aliens have been removed since the inception of 
Secure Communities in 2008.270 Although Secure Communities has 
been discontinued,271 one can see how state and local authorities 
 
 264. See id. §§ 1182, 1227. 
 265. See Johnson, supra note 102. 
 266. On November 20, 2014, President Obama announced the replacement of Secure 
Communities with a new enforcement priority program, the Priority Enforcement 
Program, aimed at limiting removal to those who have been convicted of certain high-
priority crimes. See id. 
 267. Secure Communities, supra note 93. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Johnson, supra note 95. 
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might use federal enforcement priorities to advance their own 
strategies for deporting immigrants. 
State enforcement of anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona 
exemplifies how identity theft statutes that cover the workplace 
interact with federal enforcement and create problems for 
undocumented workers.272 When Arizona enacted its Legal Arizona 
Workers Act,273 Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio announced that 
he would use his authority under the statute to establish a “criminal 
employment squad” and conduct workplace raids to find 
undocumented workers who used false Social Security numbers to 
obtain work.274 Once undocumented workers were arrested under the 
statute, the Sheriff’s Department would turn them over to ICE for 
removal.275 The Sheriff’s strategy fulfilled the local law enforcement 
agency’s objective of deporting undocumented workers, even though 
the local agency lacks actual removal authority.276 
A recent lawsuit filed to enjoin the state of Arizona from 
enforcing its identity theft provisions demonstrates how state 
enforcement harms immigrant workers.277 The lawsuit was filed by 
Puente Arizona, a community-based immigrant rights organization in 
 
 272. The Justice Department investigated the Maricopa County Criminal Employment 
Squad, along with other Department units, and found that its practices discriminated 
against Latinos on the basis of race and national origin. See Letter from Thomas Perez, 
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Attorney, 
Maricopa Cnty. (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ 
documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf. 
 273. 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, 23-211 
to -214 (2010)). 
 274. Jacques Billeaud, Joe Arpaio Closing Controversial Immigration Squad, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/18/joe -
arpaio-immigrants_n_6349204.html (explaining how the squads were shut down after the 
sheriff’s office was stripped of special federal immigration powers). Sheriff Arpaio is 
infamous for using his office to carry out anti-immigrant policies. See Joe Hagan, The 
Long Lawless Ride of Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/the-long-lawless-ride-of-sheriff-joe-arpaio-
20120802.  
 275. For a description of the Maricopa County Sheriff Office’s use of identity theft 
arrests to effect removal, see Terry Greene Sterling, The Handcuffing of Sheriff Joe, 
NAT’L J. (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-handcuffing-of-
sheriff-joe-20140731.  
 276. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012) (“Any alien (including an alien crewman) in 
and admitted to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be 
removed if the alien is within one or more of [several] classes of deportable aliens.”).  
 277. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Memorandum of Points & 
Authorities at 1–2, Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. 2:14-CV-01356-DCG (D. Ariz. Aug. 7, 
2014). 
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Phoenix.278 The lawsuit asserts that its members will suffer significant 
hardship if the state provisions are enforced.279 Puente Arizona 
members testified through declarations that they feared arrest and, 
therefore, were reluctant to exercise their labor rights as a result of 
Arizona’s enforcement of its provisions.280 Some of the declarations 
described the experience of being arrested and detained for violating 
the state’s worker identity provisions.281 The lawsuit claims that the 
implementation of the identity theft provisions has “created a state 
scheme for regulating the employment of undocumented workers.”282 
Sheriff Arpaio claimed the statute provided his department the legal 
authority to establish a criminal employment squad to carry out 
workplace raids and arrest workers on identity theft charges.283 
Consequently, the fears of immigrant rights organizations that local 
law enforcement authorities would use such statutes to enforce 
removal through attrition were realized. The Department conducted 
over eighty raids and arrested more than 790 workers through the 
operation of its criminal employment squad284 before a federal district 
court recently enjoined the practice.285 
The Arizona case and its effects—both in implementation and 
enforcement of the statute—is generalizable to the rest of the states 
that have enacted or interpreted their identity theft statutes to apply 
to the use of false information to obtain employment. By enacting 
these statutes, states have made criminals of immigrants who use false 
information of real or fictitious individuals to gain or keep 
employment. In doing so, they have claimed authority—whether 
directly, as with Sheriff Arpaio in Arizona, or indirectly, by simply 
claiming an interest in the purely criminal aspects of identity theft—
over the treatment of undocumented workers in the workplace. 
 
 278. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3–4, Puente Arizona v. 
Arpaio, No. 2:14-CV-01356-DCG (D. Ariz. June 18, 2014). A description of Puente 
Arizona, its mission, and its activities can be found at http://www.puenteaz.org. 
 279. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 278, at 2. 
 280. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Memorandum of Points & 
Authorities, supra note 277, at 23. 
 281. Id. at 25. 
 282. Id. at 2. 
 283. Id. at 8–10. 
 284. See Press Release, ACLU, Coalition Files New Suit to Halt Arpaio’s Workplace 
Raids (June 18, 2014), available at http://www.acluaz.org/issues/press-releases/2014-
06/4687. 
 285. See Order at 30, Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. 2:14-CV-01356-DCG (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 5, 2015). 
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2.  Criminalization of an Otherwise Legal Activity—Employment—
Makes Immigrant Workers More Vulnerable 
Because immigrant workers risk criminal conviction as well as 
removal for working without proper documentation, they endure 
terms and conditions of employment that are worse than those of 
their native-born counterparts. For example, employers can, and 
have, exposed them to more dangerous conditions (such as those that 
expose workers to extreme heat or toxic substances),286 and even seek 
them out for undesirable jobs.287 Additionally, immigrant workers 
suffer labor law violations at a higher rate than their native-born 
counterparts.288 Immigrants work disproportionately in low-wage 
industries marked by poor conditions.289 At times, employer 
mistreatment of immigrant workers rises to the level of criminal 
activity.290 However, because undocumented workers fear retaliation 
for seeking protection from abusive employers they frequently fail to 
report exploitation and abuse.291 An employer may feel emboldened 
knowing that an undocumented worker is less likely to bring charges 
or report abuse or crime for fear of criminal sanctions or 
deportation.292 Real fears of criminal and immigration sanctions, 
therefore, create vulnerabilities for immigrant workers in ways that 
their native-born counterparts do not experience. 
Recently, the state of California enacted or interpreted state 
statutes that illustrate both the vulnerability of undocumented 
workers and the need for their protection in employment regulation. 
 
 286. See Pia Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in Riskier Jobs?, 46 
DEMOGRAPHY 535, 535–36 (2009) (noting that immigrant workers suffer injuries at a rate 
higher than all workers).  
 287. See ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF 
WORKS: IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 156–57 (2003). 
 288. ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: 
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 42–48 (2009), 
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1. 
 289. See Orrenius & Zavodny, supra note 286, at 536. 
 290. See, e.g., United States v. Askarkhodjaev, 444 F. App’x 105, 105–06 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding an indictment on criminal charges, including fraud in foreign labor contracting, 
for employer’s scheme to recruit and exploit recruited workers). 
 291. See, e.g., Teresa Scherzer, Reiner Rugulies & Niklas Krause, Work-Related Pain 
and Injury and Barriers to Workers’ Compensation Among Las Vegas Hotel Room 
Cleaners, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483, 485–86 (2005) (finding that only twenty percent of 
immigrant hotel workers who had experienced work-related pain filed claims “for fear of 
getting in trouble” or being fired). 
 292. See, e.g., EUNICE CHO & REBECCA SMITH, WORKERS’ RIGHTS ON ICE: HOW 
IMMIGRATION REFORM CAN STOP RETALIATION AND ADVANCE LABOR RIGHTS 2 
(2013), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/Justice/2013/Workers-Rights-on-ICE-
Retaliation-Report.pdf?nocdn=1. 
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The California legislature enacted three statutes in 2013 in response 
to growing concern over the workplace exploitation of immigrant 
workers.293 In 2014, the California legislature passed a bill further 
defining the rights and remedies available to immigrant workers who 
suffered workplace retaliation.294 These new laws include specific 
protections for immigrant workers who exercise their workplace 
rights against employer retaliation.295 Among other protections, the 
four laws protect workers against immigration-related discrimination 
and threats and clearly define the types of information an employer 
can deem misrepresentation in an employment relationship.296 
The first of these laws, AB 263, provides Labor Code protections 
against retaliation for immigrant workers.297 The Legislature noted 
the vulnerability of immigrant workers in the employment 
relationship in its declaration of purpose for the statute: 
Low-wage, often immigrant, workers are the most frequent 
victims of wage theft and are also exposed to the greatest 
hazards at work . . . . Far too often, when workers come forward 
to expose unfair, unsafe, or illegal conditions, they face 
retaliation from the employer . . . . Where there are immigrant 
workers involved, employer retaliation often involves threats to 
contact law enforcement agencies, including immigration 
enforcement agencies, if a worker engages in protected 
conduct.298 
AB 263 created new Labor Code section 1019, which makes it 
unlawful for an employer or any other person to participate in an 
“unfair immigration-related” practice against a worker in retaliation 
for exercising a legal right or for conducting protected activity.299 
 
 293. See Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, 2013 Cal. Stat. 5311 (codified as amended at 
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 98.7, 1019, 1024.6, 1102.5, 1103 (West 2014)); Act of Oct. 5, 2013, 
ch. 577, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4679 (codified as amended at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 494.6, 
6103.7, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 224, 1102.5); Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, 2014 Cal. Stat. 
95 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 1019, 1024.6). 
 294. See Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (codified as amended at CAL. 
LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 1019, 1024.6). 
 295. See infra notes 297–314 and accompanying text. 
 296. See infra notes 297–314 and accompanying text. 
 297. Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, 2013 Cal. Stat. 5311 (codified as amended at CAL. 
LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 98.7, 1019, 1024.6, 1102.5, 1103). 
 298. See id. § 1, 2013 Cal. Stat. at 5313. 
 299. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1019 (defining an “unfair immigration-related practice” as 
including any of the following activities taken for retaliatory purposes: (1) “Requesting 
more or different documents than are required under [federal immigration law], or a 
refusal to honor documents tendered pursuant to [federal law] that, on their face, 
reasonably appear to be genuine”; (2) “Using the federal E-Verify system to check the 
employment authorization status of a person at a time or in a manner not required under 
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Protected activity includes actions that undocumented workers would 
not typically take because of their vulnerable status.300 The statute 
also allows an employee to file a civil action for equitable relief and 
damages for an unfair immigration-related practice and allows a court 
order to suspend an employer’s business license based on the number 
of violations of the statute.301 
In a signal to employers that the practice of discharging 
employees who provided false work authorization would not be 
tolerated, the law added new Labor Code section 1024.6.302 The 
provision prohibited an employer from discharging or discriminating, 
retaliating, or taking any adverse action against an employee because 
the employee updates or attempts to update his or her personal 
information.303 
The second law, SB 666, suspends or revokes the license of a 
business found by the courts to engage in such retaliation or in unfair 
immigration-related discrimination for retaliatory purposes.304 It also 
defines an “adverse action” as: 
Reporting or threatening to report an employee’s, former 
employee’s, or prospective employee’s suspected citizenship or 
immigration status, or the suspected citizenship or immigration 
status of a family member of the employee, former employee, 
or prospective employee, to a federal, state, or local agency 
because the employee, former employee, or prospective 
employee exercises a right [under the Labor Code or other 
relevant statutes].305 
 
[federal law] or not authorized under any memorandum of understanding governing the 
use of the federal E-Verify system”; (3) “Threatening to file or the filing of a false police 
report”; or (4) “Threatening to contact or contacting immigration authorities”). 
 300. Id. (explaining that protected activity includes: “(1) Filing a complaint or 
informing any person of an employer’s or other party’s alleged violation of this code or 
local ordinance, so long as the complaint or disclosure is made in good faith[;] (2) Seeking 
information regarding whether an employer or other party is in compliance with this code 
or local ordinance[;] (3) Informing a person of his or her potential rights and remedies 
under this code or local ordinance, and assisting him or her in asserting those rights”). The 
statute also creates a civil penalty for retaliating against a worker who complains about 
unpaid wages. See id. § 98.6. 
 301. Id. § 1019 
 302. Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, § 5, 2013 Cal. Stat. 5311, 5317 (codified as amended 
at CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6).  
 303. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6 This statute was amended in 2014 to clarify that 
personal information includes one’s Social Security number. See infra notes 309–12 and 
accompanying text (describing the importance of AB 2751). 
 304. Act of Oct. 5, 2013, ch. 577, § 1, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4679, 4680 (codified at CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE § 494.6(a)).  
 305. CAL. LAB. CODE § 244(b).  
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In addition, SB 666 makes it a “cause for suspension, disbarment, 
or other discipline” for any California licensed attorney to report or 
“threaten to report suspected immigration status of a witness or party 
to a civil or administrative action or his or her family member” 
because the person “exercises or has exercised a right related to his or 
her employment.”306 
The third piece of legislation, AB 524, clarifies that a threat to 
report any individual’s immigration status or suspected immigration 
status in order to obtain his or her property may constitute criminal 
extortion.307 This law was enacted to target employers who refused to 
pay workers their wages and instead threatened to call immigration 
authorities.308 
While these three statutes address some of the vulnerabilities of 
immigrant work, the fourth law, AB 2751, which clarifies and expands 
protections and remedies available for unfair immigration-related 
employment practices, is of most interest because it signals the 
current legislative purpose with respect to the use of false Social 
Security numbers to obtain work.309 The statute makes clear that, 
whether or not it is considered a crime, an employer cannot cite false 
use of a Social Security number as the basis for an employment 
decision once an employee seeks to correct work authorization 
information.310 Prior to the enactment of this legislation, AB 263 had 
added section 1024.6 to the Labor Code, prohibiting an employer 
from terminating or otherwise retaliating against employees who 
sought to update personal information, “unless [those] changes [were] 
directly related to the skill set, qualifications, or knowledge required 
for the job.”311 AB 2751 clarifies this provision by explaining that the 
scope of the protection for updates of personal information includes 
only work authorization, such as “a lawful change of name, Social 
 
 306. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6103.7. 
 307. Act of Oct. 5, 2013, ch. 572, 2013 Cal. Stat. 4657 (codified as amended at CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 519). Extortion is defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with 
his consent, . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear, or under color of official right.” 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 518. 
 308. See California Legislature Passes Historic Laws Protecting Immigrant Workers 
from Abusive Employers, TEAMSTERS (Sept. 12, 2013), http://teamster.org/content/ 
california-legislature-passes-historic-laws-protecting-immigrant-workers-abusive-
employers (describing the impetus for the legislation). 
 309. See Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (codified as amended at CAL. 
LAB. CODE §§ 98.6, 1019, 1024.6). 
 310. Id. § 3 (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.6). 
 311. Act of Oct. 11, 2013, ch. 732, Cal. Stat. 5311, 5313 (codified as amended at CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1024.6). 
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Security number, or federal employment authorization document.”312 
While employers can still discipline or terminate employees for 
making false statements about educational qualifications or criminal 
history, they simply cannot retaliate against employees who seek to 
revise their immigration or work authorization status. This 
clarification highlights the vulnerabilities of immigrant workers in the 
employment relationship and at the same time declares that in the 
state of California, false use of a Social Security number for work will 
not be a basis for sanction, at least not in the Labor Code. 
The California statutes described here respond to very real and 
commonplace examples of immigrant worker exploitation, such as 
employers refusing to pay for a worker’s labor or calling immigration 
authorities in retaliation for workplace complaints.313 Immigrant 
worker fear of retaliation is heightened in those states where the very 
act of working without proper documents is criminalized. 
Exploitation in those states reflects the shift from employer to 
employee sanctions in ways that create a true second-class status in 
the workplace. It also reflects a changing landscape that makes 
employment more difficult, dangerous, and exploitative for immigrant 
workers.314 
III.  THE LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF STATE DEFINITIONS 
OF IDENTITY THEFT FOR EMPLOYMENT 
As states move to criminalize false use of Social Security 
numbers and other identifying information for employment, they risk 
running afoul of congressional intent to ensure that workplace 
enforcement focuses on employer sanctions and not on worker 
sanctions. The structural argument for the preemptive effect of 
congressional activity seems strong after the Supreme Court’s 
 
 312. Act of June 28, 2014, ch. 79, § 3, 2014 Cal. Stat. 95 (codified as amended CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 1024.6). 
 313. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages, Arias v. Angelo, No. 13-CV-00904 (E.D. Cal. 
May 8, 2013) (alleging employer retaliation through threatening to report to federal 
authorities and withholding of payment and benefits to the employee); Jennifer Medina, 
Immigrant Worker Firings Unsettle a College Campus, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/us/after-workers-are-fired-an-immigration-debate-
roils-californiacampus.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print; Cynthia Moreno, Immigrants to 
Benefit from “Protection” Bills, VIDA EN EL VALLE (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.vidaenelvalle.com/2013/06/05/1528966/immigrants-to-benefit-from-
protection.html; Press Release, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance Found., Immigrant Worker 
Sues Dairy and Its Counsel for Contacting ICE in Retaliation for Asserting His Rights 
(May 8, 2013), available at http://www.crlaf.org/sites/all/files/content/uploads/pressreleases/ 
2013/130508-pr_ICE.pdf. 
 314. CHO & SMITH, supra note 292, at 1–2. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1505 (2015) 
2013] THE "WRONGFULLY" DOCUMENTED 1551 
reaffirmation of the federal government’s exclusive authority over 
immigration regulation, including worksite enforcement efforts.315 
Congress has also, however, spoken on the issue of identity theft, 
opening up the possibility for states to participate in federal 
enforcement schemes to protect individuals from identity theft 
harm.316 
How might we reconcile these statutes with each other? More 
importantly, what does federal regulation in these two arenas mean 
for the possibility of state regulation? In implementing identity theft 
laws that implicate worksite immigration regulation, states might 
argue that they are merely aiding congressional efforts to both protect 
identity theft victims and identify those who are in the country 
illegally. This Part analyzes these arguments and their implications in 
the legal and policy realm. First, this Part will analyze the problem 
through the lens of structural federalism principles involving 
preemption. It will then focus on congressional purpose in enacting 
identity theft statutes and worksite immigration regulation. 
A. Does State Criminalization of Use of False Social Security 
Numbers for Employment Violate the Supremacy Clause? 
It is a well-settled proposition that federal government activity in 
the regulation of immigration preempts state activity, either because 
Congress has occupied the field or because state statutes 
irreconcilably conflict with congressional acts. Even before the 
federal government enacted federal immigration statutes, the 
Supreme Court pronounced immigration regulation a domain 
belonging exclusively to Congress.317 Once Congress passed a federal 
immigration statute, the Supreme Court pronounced the enactment 
of federal immigration law as an embodiment of the federal plenary 
power.318 Since then, the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
federal immigration regulation trumps state regulation, either 
 
 315. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 316. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4–6 (1998). 
 317. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876) (striking down a California 
statute seeking to restrict Chinese immigration); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 
U.S. 259, 272–75 (1876) (invalidating state immigration statutes). See generally Gabriel J. 
Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration 
Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (discussing federal preemption over state 
immigration schemes).  
 318. See generally Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2942 (2012) (reiterating the historical preemptive 
power of federal immigration regulation); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 
(1893) (finding the federal government has the exclusive authority to regulate registration 
and removal of noncitizens); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) 
(finding the federal government has the exclusive authority to exclude noncitizens). 
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through field or conflict preemption, or both.319 As the Supreme 
Court recently noted in Arizona v. United States, “Federal governance 
of immigration and alien status is extensive and complex.”320 Both of 
these attributes make it that much more difficult for states to enter 
the field of immigration regulation. 
The federal government’s worksite immigration enforcement 
scheme is broad and far-reaching. Several Supreme Court opinions, 
including those discussed in Part I.E. of this Article, set out the 
contours of the federal government’s preemptive effect on state 
activity in the worksite enforcement arena. Specifically, in Arizona v. 
United States, the Supreme Court noted that, with respect to worksite 
enforcement, “IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment 
that making criminals out of aliens engaged in authorized work—
aliens who already face the possibility of employer exploitation 
because of their removable status—would be inconsistent with federal 
policy and objectives.”321 With this pronouncement the Court struck 
down state efforts to criminalize unauthorized work. The question is 
whether the Supreme Court’s rationale applies to indirect regulation 
through criminal statutes such as the identity theft statutes discussed 
here. 
B. Do the Federal Identity Theft Statutes Offer a Space for State 
Involvement in Worksite Enforcement? 
Unlike the state statutes that specifically define false use of 
identifying information to obtain employment as identity theft, the 
federal identity theft statute is silent.322 It does not specifically include 
a provision that defines the act of using a false identity to obtain 
employment as either identity theft or aggravated identity theft. 
Instead, the federal aggravated identity theft statute references the 
immigration statute and penalizes the use of false documents 
belonging to another person for identification relating to citizenship, 
immigration documents such as passports or visas, or for immigration-
related activities.323 To the extent these areas implicate immigration 
regulation, they remain exclusively federal in nature. 
There is another indicator that Congress contemplated leaving 
the enforcement in worksite fraud provisions to federal authorities. In 
its employer sanctions provisions, Congress restricted the use of 
 
 319. See, e.g., Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
 320. Id. at 2499. 
 321. Id. at 2504. 
 322. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012). 
 323. See id. § 1028(a)(6), (7), (9), (10). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1505 (2015) 
2013] THE "WRONGFULLY" DOCUMENTED 1553 
information provided in the employment verification process to 
“enforcement of this chapter and sections 1001 [relating to fraud 
against the federal government], 1028 [the federal identity fraud 
provision], 1546 [relating to immigration fraud], and 1621 [relating to 
perjury in a federal tribunal] of title 18.”324 The purpose of this 
provision was to limit the scope of crimes to which information 
provided through the employment verification process could apply. 
Notably, state laws were not included in that scope. Several other 
sections of the employer sanctions provisions of the statute limit the 
use of documents provided to verify employment to enforcement.325 
In addition, Congress contemplated that in the future the executive 
branch could require new or different documents for employment 
verification. Contemplating that eventuality, Congress enacted the 
following provision: 
If the system requires individuals to present a new card or other 
document (designed specifically for use for this purpose) at the 
time of hiring, recruitment, or referral, then such document 
may not be required to be presented for any purpose other than 
under this chapter (or enforcement of sections 1001, 1028, 1546, 
and 1621 of title 18) nor to be carried on one’s person.326 
Congress understood that its employer sanctions provisions 
would inevitably lead to the use of false identity documents.327 
Congress ultimately dealt with the problem by exempting the practice 
from criminalization. At the same time that Congress legalized a 
generation of undocumented immigrants when it included a 
legalization provision in its IRCA, Congress exempted false use of 
Social Security numbers for work from the definition of fraud in the 
Social Security statute.328 At the time, Congress understood that 
without the exemption, the vast majority of immigrants seeking 
legalization could potentially face criminal sanctions for fraud under 
the Social Security Act. This indicates that Congress’s purpose was 
not to make criminals out of those employees who worked with false 
identification documents. 
That being said, the federal government has filed criminal 
charges and litigated cases against immigrants who have used false 
Social Security numbers to obtain work, to varying degrees of 
 
 324. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5). 
 325. Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(C), (G). 
 326. Id. § 1324a(d)(2)(G). 
 327. See S. REP. NO. 98-62, at 34 (1983).  
 328. See 42 U.S.C. § 408(e). 
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success.329 The facts of Flores-Figueroa v. United States, discussed 
earlier in this Article,330 demonstrate how broadly federal prosecutors 
have interpreted the federal identity theft statutes.331 The Court, in 
response, noted examples of classic cases of identity theft, including 
dumpster diving and computer hacking, signaling that immigrants 
using false Social Security numbers for work were outside the scope 
of Congress’s intended targets.332  
C. Are the States Regulating Immigration Indirectly by Enacting 
Identity Theft for Employment Statutes? 
The federal identity theft statute notwithstanding, the states 
cannot regulate immigration through the back door any more than 
they can through a mirror-image theory, which “rests on the 
erroneous premise that Congress has implicitly authorized state 
enforcement of federal immigration law.”333 The question in the 
interpretation of these state statutes is whether the state statute was 
enacted or interpreted to promote or enforce an immigration-
regulation purpose. In other words, did the legislatures pass such 
statutes criminalizing the act of working without proper 
documentation as a way to enforce immigration regulation? To the 
extent those statutes were enacted to target immigrants, the Court’s 
pronouncement in Arizona v. United States334 would seem to apply. If 
the reason for the interpretation of the statute was to target 
undocumented immigration, it may be that the statute is preempted 
by the federal scheme to regulate immigration in the workplace, 
which includes specific sanctions for the use of false documents to 
obtain work.335 This is the case with the Arizona and Georgia statutes, 
for example, which evince in their titles the intent to target and 
criminalize unauthorized work.336 This may also be the case with the 
rest of the statutes that were enacted in the place of more general 
 
 329. See, e.g., Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657 (2009); Response of 
Defendants at 15, United States v. Moreno-Lopez, No.: 4:09-cr-00021 (E.D. Tenn. May 19, 
2010).  
 330. See supra notes 117–30 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 332. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 655. 
 333. Chin & Miller, supra note 317, at 252. The mirror-image theory posits that states 
should be able to enact and enforce criminal immigration laws as long as they further the 
purposes of federal immigration statutes. Id. Professors Chin and Miller critique this 
mirror-image theory of state regulation. See id. 
 334. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 335. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), (b) (2012). 
 336. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. 
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anti-immigrant statutes, if their legislative histories betray a purpose 
to regulate immigration.337 
What about statutes that are more indirect or whose silence has 
been interpreted by courts to apply to the use of false information to 
obtain employment? Legal scholars have argued that federal law 
should preempt indirect statutes that criminalize behavior related to 
immigration status. Professors Chin and Miller, for example, argue 
that such indirect state attempts to “mirror” federal statutes through 
criminal law as a way of furthering federal purpose or intent fall 
outside the scope of the state police power.338 They argue that in 
criminalizing behavior that is related to immigration status, the states 
must demonstrate how such status is related to a legitimate state 
interest other than the desire to regulate immigration.339 The mirror-
image theory fails to provide a legitimate state interest in an 
independent state police power if it is premised on deriving its 
authority from federal authority.340 They conclude that the states can 
only prosecute those crimes that fall within their sovereign 
authority.341 With respect to constitutionality, therefore, “[t]hat one 
government enacts a law within its exclusive jurisdiction does not 
enlarge the constitutional authority of the other.”342 
Regulation of immigration is a different premise from a state 
using its police power to regulate immigrants within its boundaries. 
Historically, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between state 
statutes that purport to regulate immigration—which are invalid—
and state statutes that affect immigrants without necessarily affecting 
immigration regulation. The Supreme Court most recently addressed 
the difference in Arizona v. United States,343 holding that state 
immigration regulation of unauthorized work through criminalization 
was preempted.344 
Courts that have addressed this problem of indirect state 
regulation in other contexts have held that a preemption analysis 
should consider not just the text of a state statute but its purpose and 
effect as well.345 Courts determine the practical impact of the statute 
when weighing the preemptive effect of a congressional statutory 
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 338. Chin & Miller, supra note 317, at 259. 
 339. Id. at 312. 
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 343. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 343. Id. at 2510. 
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framework.346 Ultimately, a state law cannot “frustrate the operation 
of federal law,” whether directly or indirectly, even when the 
legislature “had some other purpose in mind other than one of 
frustration.”347 This line of cases indicates that whether or not the 
states had a purpose to regulate immigration or to encourage self-
deportation of undocumented immigrants, their entry into the 
immigration regulation field through criminalization of workplace 
misrepresentation would be preempted. Congress did not explicitly or 
implicitly open the door to state immigration regulation when it 
expanded its federal identity theft statute to include the use of false 
information and to provide individuals with remedies. 
In sum, to the extent that federal identity theft laws create crimes 
for immigration-related fraud, the federal jurisdiction remains 
exclusively federal. No state purpose, direct or indirect, gives it the 
power to supersede the federal immigration scheme. Given 
Congress’s occupation of the immigration regulation field, states 
should not be allowed to mirror the federal identity theft crimes, even 
if Congress decided not to preempt general state identity theft 
statutes. Criminalizing identity theft in general has different 
implications than criminalizing the use of false information to obtain 
employment. To the extent that Congress maintains preemptive 
authority over immigration regulation, the subset of workplace 
identity theft remains in the hands of the federal government, to the 
exclusion of the states. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has introduced the history of employer sanctions 
provisions and the role of worksite immigration regulation to 
demonstrate how the criminalization of unauthorized work was 
outside the scope of congressional intent when the employer 
sanctions framework was established. The failure of past Congresses 
to adequately resolve the struggles between employers pulling 
workers into the United States and enforcement efforts to dissuade 
the pull have resulted in a decades-long public discussion about 
undocumented immigration. The discussion has led to the current 
efforts to define the use of false documents for work as a form of 
identity theft. Ultimately, the criminalization of unauthorized work 
through state identity theft statutes operates to criminalize behavior 
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not intended to be sanctioned under former or current immigration 
schemes. 
While this criminalization at the state level aids and abets 
administrative decisions to turn from apprehensions to detention and 
deportation as the principal means of immigration regulation in the 
United States, it does little to heed congressional calls for an 
employer-focused sanctioning mechanism. The increasing scrutiny on 
the unauthorized worker follows the pattern of immigration 
regulation over temporary workers in the United States and the 
diminishing protections for an already vulnerable population. This 
Article has demonstrated how the interaction between state criminal 
laws and federal law regulating immigration make the current 
deportation scheme today’s de facto temporary worker program. One 
prescription lies in invalidating the employment provisions in state 
identity theft statutes. Statutes that effect immigration regulation 
through criminal law are arguably unconstitutional for structural 
reasons: they encroach on congressional and executive authority, 
prosecutorial discretion, and sovereignty-related concerns that belong 
to the federal government.348 More importantly, they perpetuate a 
line of reasoning that contradicts the very basis of worksite 
immigration enforcement: to make employers accountable for 
unauthorized work. 
 
 348. See generally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and 
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